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What is the best way for the various responder silos to communicate situational 
awareness information across complex homeland security incidents? With the advent of 
wireless data networks, homeland security responders have the opportunity to instantly 
communicate vast volumes of information across myriad local, state, and federal 
resources. Finding a common, interoperable language for a network-centric response 
environment is essential to avoid duplicating the patchwork of communication techniques 
in place today. A comparative analysis between Department of Defense and Department 
of Homeland Security finds the agencies have very similar situational awareness needs. 
The Department of Defense is more advanced in its development of networked situational 
awareness communication. The humble map lies at the heart of situational awareness 
tools and requires a common visual language to be interoperable. This thesis recommends 
a common national symbols set that visually communicates situational awareness across 
a network. Applying semiotic principles to symbols creates a visual metalanguage that 
answers not only “What?” and “Where?” questions, but also provides essential 
operational context by incorporating the attributes of incident resources into the symbols 
themselves. 
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Can responders from various disciplines communicate situational awareness more 
effectively during homeland security incidents? 
Homeland security incidents vary widely in type and scale, from minor local 
events contained within one jurisdiction to major events that might span local, regional, 
and state boundaries. Responder’s decisions must be supported by the best possible 
information to reduce losses and mitigate incidents. Case studies have found confusion 
and miscommunication contribute to the loss of life, property, and the squandering of 
precious resources despite advances in incident command training and improved wireless 
communication tools. Responder reliance on voice communications for information 
exchange has repeatedly failed to provide the necessary situational awareness required to 
support decision making. 
Increasingly present in the response environment is the wireless data network. 
This development follows the example of the Department of Defense (DOD), which has 
committed itself to the use of a network for improving its warfighting effectiveness. The 
DOD has reported to Congress that a network improves information sharing, which 
enhances the quality of available information and improves self-synchronization of 
forces. These facts dramatically increase mission effectiveness. The DOD has identified 
“network-centric warfare” as their top modernization priority and the most effective 
means of providing effective decision support to its warfighters. 
The situational awareness needs of warfighters and homeland security responders 
are strikingly similar. A comparative analysis was performed to see if the DOD 
situational awareness doctrine could be applied in a useful way to answer the thesis 
question. Warfighters and responders face different enemies but similar circumstances, 
including danger, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and complexity. These factors comingle 
to create Carl von Clausewitz’s “fog of war” on the battlefield and in the homeland, 
wreaking havoc in both environments. The DOD is utilizing a network to clear this fog 
with field-deployable network infrastructure and a variety of software tools to provide 
 xviii 
situational awareness within the networked battlespace. Blue-force tracker, Link 16, 
Force XXI Battle Brigade and Below are all situational awareness software tools intended 
to share information among warfighters. These tools serve as an example to homeland 
security responders, and at the heart of each of these complex tools, lies the humble map. 
The tenets of network-centric warfare apply to homeland security response, 
giving rise to the need of doctrine for a network-centric response environment. There is a 
national effort to create a common homeland security wireless network known as 
FirstNet. FirstNet creates the infrastructure necessary to support network-centric 
response, but what software will run on that infrastructure? What will the common 
language of situational awareness be? A variety of tools are in development nationally 
but they are each unique, and expose the nation to another layer of interoperability issues 
caused by patchwork regional solutions. Following in the footsteps of the DOD, a map 
lies at the heart of domestic situational awareness tools in development. National policy 
must guide the development of a common language communicated within a networked, 
mapped environment to ensure all users are able to share situational awareness and 
collaborate on decisions. 
Mapping is a visual medium whether on paper or in a digital environment. Digital 
maps allow for the development of a geographic information system, which symbolizes 
tabular data for easy visual communication and correlation to a specific geography. The 
symbols overlaid on a geographic information system play an essential role in 
information exchange. One previous national effort has been undertaken to standardize 
those symbols for improved interoperability. ANSI INCITS 415—Homeland Security 
Mapping Standard attempts to build a common language for maps in the homeland 
security environment but has been poorly accepted and largely ignored by the 
professionals who use homeland security mapping products. This thesis argues ANSI 
failed because their standard does not utilize simple semiotic principles nor provide 
useful context to the user. 
A national symbol set designed for use in a full-color, networked response 
environment is sorely needed. By applying simple semiotic principles to symbols design, 
they can become an easy-to-interpret visual metalanguage. Symbols differentiated by 
 xix 
color, shape, size, texture, and vector might sound simplistic but are currently not defined 
nationally. By using these principles on information drawn from the attribute table of the 
resource itself it is possible to create compounded symbols, which add the needed context 
demanded by homeland security decision makers. 
This thesis makes six recommendations to achieve a national visual language to 
capture the known benefits of a network in the homeland security response environment: 
• Identify the tenets of network-centric response as essential to the 
Homeland Security enterprise. 
• Identify a geographic information system as the preferred platform upon 
which networked visual communication of situational awareness will 
occur. 
• Define a common set of cartographic pragmatics specific to homeland 
security mapping applications. 
• Symbolize the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 
resource guidebook to create an initial national homeland security point 
symbols set. 
• Use subject matter experts to create attribute tables for all typed homeland 
security resources. 
• Define modifiers for the national symbols set drawn from the attribute 
tables of resources to create useful context within each symbol. 
Application of these recommendations will improve national interoperability and 
deliver the known benefits of a network to support homeland security decision makers. 
The resulting improved situational awareness will improve the efficiency of operations 
and reduce losses of life and property. 
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 1 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF NETWORK-CENTRIC SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS  
A. THESIS QUESTION 
This thesis answers the question: Can responders from various disciplines 
communicate situational awareness more effectively during homeland security incidents?  
With the arrival of mobile wireless broadband data networks, there is an 
opportunity to dramatically improve how situational awareness will be shared among the 
various responder communities that manage incidents of all types and scales. The need 
for a common operating picture among all assets operating at an incident is essential. 
There are efforts occurring on multiple fronts to develop technologies to assist responders 
with this need, but without clear direction set in policy, it is likely that regional solutions 
will develop that are not interoperable on a national scale. This thesis will research the 
various concepts of situational awareness sharing currently in development. It will also 
identify shortcomings in national policy and recommend a national strategy for best 
practices. Developing a common language for responder situational awareness sharing is 
paramount and may be better accomplished using principles defined in the science of the 
human perception of symbols, known as semiotics. 
B. INTRODUCTION 
Emergency responders manage complex, fluid events fraught with uncertainty and 
danger each and every day. Those responders go to great lengths to communicate with 
one another the details of events as they unfold in an effort to share what has happened 
and what is happening to anticipate what might happen as the event unfolds into the 
future. Their purpose is to protect responder safety while attempting to protect the lives, 
property, and well-being of the citizens they serve. These communicated bits of data are 
used to build a common operating picture and situational awareness among responders. 
For generations, those data exchanges have occurred by voice or written word through a 
progression of technologies.  
 2 
It is, unfortunately, common for those data exchanges to fall short of a depiction 
of the complete picture, and lives are lost, property is destroyed, and scarce resources are 
squandered as a result. The stakes could not possibly be higher, and are best depicted by 
the words of responders themselves: 
I listened to the radio as officers tried to determine where in the parking 
lot off Lamar street the shooter or shooters might be—frantically 
searching, trying to find out where he, she, they could be… I got close and 
saw a crowd of officers and stopped to ask them where the field command 
post for the demonstration was. They weren’t sure although it turned out it 
was about a half a block away. I got my bearings and found it in the 
confusion.1  
—Major Max Geron, Dallas Police Department, reflecting on his response 
to the assassination of officers on July 7, 2016 
This single unit of confusion, compounded and amplified across an incident scene 
where dozens to hundreds of responders are operating with similar questions, then 
multiplied by the number of agencies involved is the issue this paper attempts to address. 
Despite advances in incident command training and improved tools for wireless 
communications, responder reliance on voice communications for situational awareness 
data has failed to address the confusion of Major Geron during a critical incident. His 
reflection shows that he, as well as other officers at the scene, were operating in a state of 
confusion, not just about the location of the perpetrator(s), but of basic, preplanned, 
knowable information about Dallas police resources, locations, and asset statuses. This 
confusion repeats itself over and over again nationally, at incidents as small as a 
residential fire to multi-state natural disasters. The result of this confusion is always the 
same: lives lost, property destroyed, and opportunities for efficiencies squandered. There 
is only one other place where Americans face comparable complexity, danger, and 
uncertainty: the battlefield. Perhaps we can look there for answers to these persistent 
problems. 
Information surrounds homeland security incidents of all kinds, from a traffic 
accident to a complex multi-state hurricane and everything in between; effective 
                                                 
1 Max Geron, “Reflections by a Dallas Police Officer,” Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 
July 11, 2016, https://www.chds.us/c/item/3918.  
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planning, response, mitigation, and recovery decisions are dependent on sharing the right 
information with the right people at the right time. Victims, bystanders, responders, and 
emergency managers are dependent on this shared information for the creation of a 
shared understanding about what has happened, what is currently happening, and what is 
forecast to occur in the future. This shared understanding is known as situational 
awareness, or a common operating picture; for the purposes of this research, the two 
terms shall be used interchangeably. 
Homeland security incidents requiring an incident management system often 
involve a response from multiple agencies, multiple disciplines, and potentially local, 
state, and federal assets. Large-scale events can occur across wide geographical areas or 
even in multiple separate geographic areas. Maintaining situational awareness and a 
common operating picture throughout the Incident Management System (IMS), from the 
command post to the operator in the field, is essential for safe, effective and efficient 
operations.  
Often situational awareness information within one discipline is not shared with 
other disciplines involved in the same incident. There are many cases where the loss of a 
common operating picture across disciplines has resulted in deaths, injuries, property 
damage, or inefficient use of resources. Research is directed at determining the 
effectiveness of existing situational awareness sharing methodologies and identifying 
opportunities for improved response effectiveness and efficiency. The sharing of 
situational awareness data is done through a variety of communications methods, and for 
the purposes of this thesis, communications is defined as: 
Information transfer and involves the technology associated with the 
representation, transfer, interpretation, and processing of data among 
persons, places, and machines. It includes transmission, emission, or 
reception of signs, signals, writings, images, and sounds or intelligence of 
any nature by wire, radio, optical, or other electromagnetic systems.2 
On the simplest of levels, communications must have a common language to be 
successful. While this may seem rudimentary, the relevant issue is not the intermixing of 
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2004), 113. 
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foreign languages within a response framework, but the intermixing of the various 
prevention, response, mitigation and recovery terms, each with their own industry-
specific vernaculars. Finding a common language for the various responder disciplines is 
essential to the communication of situational awareness. Communications between 
international responders who speak different languages are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
Large-scale events requiring designated, professional incident management teams 
will draw resources of all kinds to the event. Each of these resources is potentially drawn 
from different jurisdictions, different professional disciplines, and potentially, from 
around the country or around the world. These myriad responder silos develop 
independent of one another, and while there is some effort to standardize much of the 
intra-disciplinary jargon through national standards and federal response guidebooks, the 
effort has to date been largely unsuccessful.3 Responders continue to use silo-specific 
terminology and phrasing, decreasing situational awareness across an incident when 
communicating outside their silo. 
This thesis will investigate the cognitive barriers to verbal communication of data 
between responders, and propose a common and easily understood visual language as a 
solution. I am proposing the development of simple, contextually relevant symbols for 
each responder silo. When designed to convey contextually rich information in an easily 
interpretable way, a visual language maximizes the benefits of communicating via a 
broadband network. 
A basic symbols set for each discipline, when coupled with tools like next-
generation incident command and other geographic information system (GIS)-based 
software in a network-centric response environment will likely be far more effective at 
communicating developing information across a theater-wide network of responders than 
any tool in use today. This thesis will include determining the appropriate policies needed 
to govern the systematic development of network-centric situational awareness 
                                                 
3 Heather K. Meeds, Communication Challenges during Incidents of National Significance: A Lesson 
from Hurricane Katrina (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai? 
verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA448607. 
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communication tools. Recommendations will adhere to basic semiotic principles and 
guidelines with examples from various sources. Within each responder discipline, there is 
likely a national standard-setting association that should be tasked with determining what 
contextual data within their silo are most relevant to situational awareness. This thesis 
will identify a method for developing contextually relevant visual communications in a 
network-centric response environment, overseen by subject matter experts within each 
response discipline. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has coined the term “network-centric 
warfare”4 to describe the electronically interconnected command and control features of 
the modern battlefield. The wireless network was identified as a tool that could increase 
“synergy for command and control,” resulting in more effective decisions by fighting 
forces.5 Since the early 21st century America’s armed forces have introduced networked 
information systems throughout the various branches of service creating network-centric 
fighting forces on land, at sea, and in the air. Technological limitations have kept this 
network from reaching the single warfighter resolution, but research on networking each 
soldier is underway. U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal was an early believer in the 
power of networked information on the battlefield, stating: 
It became clear to me and to many others that to defeat a networked 
enemy we had to become networked ourselves. We had to figure out a 
way to maintain our traditional capabilities of professionalism, 
technology, and when needed, overwhelming force, while achieving levels 
of knowledge, speed, precision, and unity of effort that only a network 
could provide.6 
The fog of war faced by American warfighters is very similar to the confusion of 
homeland security responders and the DOD may set numerous examples useful to 
civilian responders. General McChrystal’s goals of knowledge, speed, precision, and 
                                                 
4 Clay Wilson, Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress (CRS 
Report No. RL32411) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/natsec/RL32411.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Troops Loaded with Technology, But Can’t Harness the Power of the Network–
Blog,” National Defense Magazine, February 23, 2011, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/ 
Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=327. 
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unity of effort closely align to the needs of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and those of first responders everywhere. The DOD has clarified its view of the value of 
network-centric warfare to warfighters in a report to Congress: 
• A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 
• Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information 
and shared situational awareness. 
• Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization. 
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.7 
A better description of the information needs of responders at homeland security 
incidents could not be drafted. To that end, the DHS should consider the value of 
defining a common language within network-centric response. 
This thesis presupposes that while the term “network-centric response” has not 
yet found its way to mainstream DHS doctrine, the development of networked response is 
well underway. A wide variety of networked response applications are already in use or 
development across the nation. Congress has agreed to its value by allocating 
electromagnetic spectrum for the development of a dedicated wireless broadband network 
specifically for homeland security use known as First Responder Network Authority 
(FirstNet).8 FirstNet is intended to be used for interoperable responder communications 
and the delivery of rich media, without the fragility and patchwork nature of the 
commercial broadband networks or existing land-based mobile radio systems.9 What has 
not been made clear is the manner in which this rich volume of information will be 
communicated, nor how responders will learn to communicate with a common language 
that is easily understood between the various disciplines at the local, state, and national 
level. This thesis will argue that semiotics will help define a common visual 
communication language more robust than verbal exchange or written words. Such a 
                                                 
7 U.S. Department of Defense, “Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report to 
Congress,” July 27, 2001, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/ncw_report/report/ncw_cover.html. 
8 First Responder Network Authority, Public Safety Advisory Committee Fact Sheet (Reston, VA: First 




visual language is effective in a variety of mediums but is ideal when communicated 
across a digital network. 
Tools and applications to this end are present in DOD and civilian programs. 
While research is underway to bring a wireless information network to the individual 
soldier, firefighter, or police officer, there is currently no effective solution at such a fine 
resolution. This thesis will be limited to methods for sharing situational awareness across 
an entire theater of operations between mounted unit resources. Recommendations will 
not address the networking of individual responders. Additionally, recommendations will 
be general enough to be applicable to the various response silos while leaving room for 
experts from each industry to decide what information items are considered to be 
contextually relevant. This thesis will attempt to describe a semiotic framework for visual 
communication, from within which each discipline will be responsible for refining its 
own terms. The study of military capabilities is also limited to the public domain; no 
classified materials were available for the development of this thesis. 
Upcoming chapters include a comprehensive literature review that will describe 
the body of policy surrounding situational awareness in homeland security incidents, the 
current state of the art in network-centric response, the current state of the art in network-
centric warfare and an investigation into the science of semiotics for tools relevant to the 
sharing of situational awareness data visually across a network. Once this foundation has 
been laid, Chapter III will analyze current civilian efforts at capturing the utility of a 
network for situational awareness communications and identify successes and failures to 
date. Chapter IV will investigate the DOD’s needs and compare them to the needs of 
DHS. Chapter IV will compare and contrast those tools available to the DOD with 
civilian needs, and more closely investigate their use of symbols as a part of network-
centric communications. Chapter V will identify those precepts of the science of 
semiotics relevant to responders and compare them to the use of symbols in military 
applications. Chapter V will also discuss the shortcomings of previous attempts to create 
national symbols sets for the first responder community. Chapter V will apply the 
semiotic principles defined to discuss the concept of including contextually relevant 
information within a symbol set, drawn from the attributes of the asset itself. Chapter VI 
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will conclude with recommendations for national policy on developing a contextually 
relevant visual language for networked communication of situational awareness. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“The common operating picture is used to overcome coordination and information 
management problems during emergency response.”10 This literature review is an 
attempt to develop a comprehensive understanding of common operating picture, the 
difficulties in communicating such, and current attempts to improve it. The literature is 
divided into seven distinct categories: First is the body of policy surrounding defining the 
need for a common operating picture. Second is the use of communication tools for 
developing situational awareness. Third is a description of the emergence of wireless 
networks for information exchange. Fourth is a depiction of the current state of the art for 
sharing a common operating picture in emergency operations. Fifth is an investigation of 
technology in development for situational awareness data exchange. Sixth is a review of 
semiotics and those principles that might apply to the sharing of situational awareness 
information with symbols. Finally, a comprehensive review of the non-classified military 
literature on the development and sharing of situational awareness on the modern 
network-centric battlefield is conducted to see if homeland security could be enhanced by 
lessons learned in warfare. 
A. BODY OF POLICY 
The National Response Framework (NRF) mandates the use of the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) in response to incidents of all scales.11 NIMS 
defines common operating picture as “An overview of an incident created by collating 
and gathering information—such as traffic, weather, actual damage, resource 
availability—of any type (voice, data, etc.) from agencies/organizations in order to 
support decision making.”12 The definition of common operating picture is embedded in 
                                                 
10 Jeroen Wolbers and Kees Boersma, “The Common Operational Picture as Collective Sensemaking,” 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 21, no. 4 (2013): 186–99, doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12027. 
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/ 
32230?id=7371. 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 
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the “communications and information management” component of NIMS and is a term 
interchangeable with “situational awareness” in many documents.13 For the purposes of 
this thesis, “situational awareness” and “common operating picture” will be synonymous. 
While the terms may be commingled in the literature, they are anything but 
clearly defined in the minds of crisis managers and responders. In 2007, the United States 
War College hosted a conference that included a workshop for local state and federal 
crisis managers entitled “Development and Dissemination of a ‘Common Operational 
Picture’ in Preparation, Response, and Recovery Operations between the Components of 
the Military and Civilian Authorities at All Levels of Government.”14 Participants were 
asked to define situational awareness one word at a time and had difficulty agreeing on 
definitions for each word.15 The workshop conclusions were that the components of a 
common operating picture extend far beyond conditions currently existing within an 
incident. Sharing situational awareness includes tracking the past, present, and future 
status of myriad components that require input from a broad range of services 
representing a complex array of disciplines. For planning purposes, workshop attendees 
decided a common operating picture is best developed via the flow of data through a 
focal point, and that national effort should be directed at defining the standards for inputs 
and outputs to that focal point.16 
NIMS was developed as a result of Presidential Policy Directive 5 (PPD-5), now 
succeeded by PDD-8,17 which mandated the development of a national model for 
incident command. The NRF and NIMS are clear on the need for theater situational 
awareness. By defining it in the communications and information management 
component of NIMS, national policy defines the quality of shared situational awareness 
                                                 
13 Michael E. Stiso et al., “Building a Flexible Common Operational Picture to Support Situation 
Awareness in Crisis Management,” in Proceedings of the 10th International ISCRAM Conference, 220–29, 
2013, http://heim.ifi.uio.no/~ketils/kst/Articles/2013.ISCRAM-II.pdf.  
14 Jeffrey Copeland, Emergency Response: Unity of Effort through a Common Operational Picture 




17 George W. Bush, Presidential Policy Directive 8 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011). 
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by the quality of information flowing throughout an incident. How this information is 
managed and communicated varies greatly. 
B. COMMUNICATIONS CREATE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Communications are simply defined as the imparting or exchanging of 
information.18 Executive order has required that federal, state, and local governments are 
able to communicate continuously at all times.19 The purpose of this requirement is to 
allow for the development of shared situational awareness across the range of involved 
responder organizations and individuals. Placing the correct information in the hands of 
decision makers in a timely manner is essential for response and recovery efforts. There 
are many case studies for both effective and ineffective communications and the impact 
each had on operations. Hurricane Katrina presented an excellent case of communication 
failures that contributed to undue death and destruction.20 During Katrina, first 
responders were unable to communicate across the affected area to coordinate search and 
rescue operations for several reasons. Katrina damaged the land-based power and 
communication infrastructure that local responders relied upon, and as the incident 
progressed to the state and federal level, responders found their communications 
equipment to be incompatible.21 Interoperable communications are described as a key 
component of sharing situational awareness data by NIMS.22 
Communications interoperability is one of the most important issues facing local 
responders.23 The DHS Office of Emergency Communications has identified technology 
as both the culprit and the cure for communications interoperability issues.24 There is a 
                                                 
18 Dictionary.com, s.v. “Communications,” accessed November 7, 2015, http://www.dictionary.com/ 
browse/communications?s=t. 
19 Exec. Order No. 13618, 77 C.F.R. 133 (2012), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=716231. 
20 Meeds, Communication Challenges during Incidents of National Significance: A Lesson from 
Hurricane Katrina. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System. 
23 Department of Homeland Security, “National Summary of Statewide Communication 
Interoperability Plans (SCIPs),” February 2009, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=782303. 
24 Ibid. 
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nationwide need for common communications technology, with common operating 
protocols that allow local responders to insert themselves into a command structure 
anywhere in the country and operate with little or no communications difficulty.25 Since 
2007, the states have developed statewide communications interoperability plans as part 
of their requirements for continued federal grant funding; these plans are limited to voice 
communications and do not address the exchange of data in other mediums.26 
Interoperable communications are fundamental to response; lack of interoperability has 
been linked to many responder deaths, including many responding to the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001.27 
C. WIRELESS NETWORKS FOR COMMUNICATING SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS 
Analog, land-based mobile radios are the prevalent communication tool among 
first responders.28 Radio failures in emergency circumstances are well documented, so 
much so that the National Fire Protection Association is drafting a new standard in an 
attempt to improve the reliability of radio hardware.29 Mobile radios are designed to 
transmit voice in a simplex design, allowing one system user to transmit information and 
all other users to listen. A vast array of hardware and software is required to support 
public safety voice radio networks, including the licensure of radio spectrum, repeater 
towers, continuously powered infrastructure, and software to manage radio traffic. Most 
systems are designed to meet the continuity of operations outlined in Exec. Order No. 
13681,30 with secured perimeters, backup power supplies, and redundant systems.31 
                                                 
25 Department of Homeland Security, “National Summary of Statewide Communication 
Interoperability Plans (SCIPs).” 
26 Ibid. 
27 National Task Force on Interoperability, Executive Summary, Why Can’t We Talk? (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
204348a.pdf. 
28 Office of Justice Program, National Institute of Justice, Guide for the Selection of Communication 
Equipment for Emergency First Responders, vol. 100 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2002), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1653. 
29 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1802: Standard on Personal Portable (Hand-Held) 
Two-Way Radio Communications Devices for Use by Emergency Services Personnel in the Hazard Zone, 
unpublished.  
30 Exec. Order No. 13618. 
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Traditionally, the transfer of data between responders occurred by voice, with one person 
speaking and everyone else listening. The arrival of the information age has delivered the 
ability to transfer larger volumes of data at far greater rates. 
Wireless digital information exchange has passed through several stages of 
development and arrived at the 4th generation of Long Term Evolution (4GLTE).32 
There are five key reasons emergency responders traditionally face communication 
interoperability problems: limited funding, limited coordination and planning, and limited 
or fragmented available radio spectrum.33 These same issues confront responders when 
attempting to share wireless digital data. FirstNet was authorized by the U.S. Congress in 
2012 in an attempt to rectify all five of these issues.34 The goal of FirstNet is to establish 
a nationwide broadband network accessible to all public safety services and allow the 
exchange of data at broadband speed at all times and in all locations, simultaneously. 
Funding for FirstNet is provided in part by the public auction of broadband spectrum to 
private industry, and through the sale of subscriptions to public safety organizations 
nationwide.35 FirstNet will allow the myriad of data transfer solutions currently utilized 
by public safety to be moved off the commercial networks and onto a secured, hardened, 
protected broadband network. 
D. STATE OF THE ART SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TOOLS 
The creation of widely available, reliable wireless broadband service to first 
responders opens possibilities that were unheard of even a decade ago. Currently, 
numerous projects are underway attempting to harness this new broadband spectrum to 
improve situational awareness for responders across jurisdictions, borders, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 Interoperable Emergency Communications: Does the National Broadband Plan Meet the Needs of 
First Responders? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and 
Response, 111th Cong., 2 (2010). 
32 National Task Force on Interoperability, Executive Summary, Why Can’t We Talk? 
33 Ibid. 
34 First Responder Network Authority, FirstNet and Emergency Medical Services (Reston, VA: First 




disciplines. A number of software services are being offered to public safety 
organizations utilizing commercial broadband networks. New World Systems, Tritech 
Software Systems, and Active 911 are just a few software vendors offering public safety 
dispatching and call management solutions, all of which rely on commercial broadband 
networks for wireless data exchange.36 These types of solutions allow for the exchange 
of data between the various agencies with subscriptions to their services, which improve 
interoperability within the subscriber jurisdictions but leaves another national patchwork 
of proprietary systems. FirstNet will also require agency subscriptions but will have 
commonly defined nation-wide data standards, allowing for common, interoperable data 
sharing nationally. 
Improving field situational awareness will require more than data interoperability. 
True improvements result in improved understanding of theater-wide response activities. 
This applies to small local incidents or nationally scaled events. Situational awareness 
needs will vary from one type of responder to another, and from one end of the command 
structure to the other. Creating a common operating picture in the information age will 
come not only from developing a network to transfer vast volumes of data but from 
finding methods to filter and share only relevant information most needed by the 
individual seeking it. Type 1 incident command teams may have a great need for satellite 
imagery of an entire state, while a local responder may only need to know where the next 
closest police car is, and whether or not they are on their way to the correct location. 
With the increasing availability of broadband, and the approach of FirstNet, state 
of the art situational awareness data will be managed by software that allows for the 
layering of information by type, and filtered by settings defined by the end users roles 
and responsibilities.37 A GIS allows the coupling of comprehensive tabular data to 
geographic features in the real world.38 GIS is used today to plot maps and manage 
                                                 
36 “Aegis Fire and EMS,” accessed November 8, 2015, http://www.newworldsystems.com/Public-
Safety/Solutions/Fire-EMS/; “Comprehensive, Easy to Deploy Public Safety Solutions,” accessed 
November 8, 2015, http://www.tritech.com/products/perform; “How It Works,” accessed November 8, 
2015, https://www.active911.com/. 
37 Susan Lindell Radke, Russ Johnson, and Jeff Baranyi, Enabling Comprehensive Situational 
Awareness (Redlands, CA: Esri Press, 2013). 
38 Radke, Johnson, and Baranyi, Enabling Comprehensive Situational Awareness. 
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location-specific data in unlimited numbers of overlays. For example, a map of statewide 
counties might be overlaid with median incomes, or median ages, for a snapshot of these 
demographics across the state. These same principles can be applied to data relevant to 
public safety officials; for example, a GIS can take a table of hazardous materials 
manifests and plot them across a wide area by known locations. The density of hazardous 
materials storage can then be considered when working in these areas. GIS allows 
relevant responder information to be plotted across the response area, regardless of 
scale.39 GIS provides a platform to embed lengthy lists of asset attributes in a 
geolocation, marked by a symbol or set of symbols. When coupled with wireless 
broadband, GIS becomes an excellent tool for real-time data exchange regarding assets, 
their attributes, and their actions.40 
The Public Safety Communications Research Program (PSCR), organized under 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, has been assigned the responsibility of research and 
development for public safety communications affecting the next 20 years.41 In their 
roadmap to the future, they identify location-based services as being the most critical 
component of communications technology for public safety.42 These researchers state 
technological research and development funds should be directed at improved location-
based services software and hardware to meet their objectives of optimized common 
operating pictures, data interoperability, improved mobility, and interoperability of 
nationwide networks. Of particular interest to PSCR is the development of high-
resolution Z-axis locations (altitude), allowing for geolocation within tall structures, and 
the extension of high-resolution location-based services to rural areas. With these two 
improvements, a host of opportunities follow. 
                                                 
39 Radke, Johnson, and Baranyi, Enabling Comprehensive Situational Awareness. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ryan Felts et al., Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) Program Location-Based 
Services R [and] D Roadmap (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2015), 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/TechnicalNotes/NIST.TN.1883.pdf. 
42 Ibid., 14. 
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E. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPMENT 
Improved high-resolution Z-axis locating systems, in conjunction with wireless 
networking, would allow for accurate geolocation within tall structures. Identifying the 
location of responders within tall structures and sharing those locations incident-wide 
would have a dramatic effect on incident common operating pictures. PSCR describes 
indoor route planning as an “underserved market” with great future potential when 
coupled with Z axis location.43 This capability could be coupled with responder body 
sensors to allow for complete understanding of physical condition and location at all 
times, incident-wide. In the future, it is possible indoor route planning will extend to 3D 
mapping, allowing real-time imagery enhancement for responders with little or no 
visibility. 
The upcoming availability of FirstNet and networked management of assets 
equipped with location-based sensors represents a national opportunity. FEMA has 
already identified many of the types of assets and their attributes of interest to national 
response.44 The technology exists today to allow for the geolocation of those resources 
and the communication of those locations via wireless data exchange with a GIS server. 
When high-resolution geolocation is combined with FEMA typing and overlaid on a GIS, 
we approach a new age in situational awareness and the sharing of a common operating 
picture among responders. The advent of FirstNet expands the possibilities to include the 
two-way flow of situational awareness data to and from a networked data-hub, which 
continuously updates statuses and conditions on the ground in real time, thereby creating 
an optimized common operating picture for use by each unique user within public safety. 
                                                 
43 Felts et al., Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) Program Location-Based Services R 
[and] D Roadmap, 20. 
44 “FEMA’s Tier 1 National Resource Typing Definitions,” March 2009, https://www.fema.gov/ 
national-incident-management-system/national-integration-center-resource-management.  
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F. SEMIOTICS AND INFORMATION SHARING 
Semiotics is the study of visual communication through signs and symbols.45 
Human beings have been using symbols and signs since the beginning of recorded 
history, and in fact, the earliest human histories are preserved as glyphs etched in stone.46 
When considering human communication, there is a tendency to separate written and 
verbal communication from imagery, which is often relegated to the status of artwork.47 
It is often presupposed that for visual communication to be considered effective, it must 
contain the standard prose conventions of the written word. Thus, visual communication 
is often erroneously considered a less effective communication medium than verbal or 
written information exchanges.48  
However, there are almost limitless possibilities for symbolized communication. 
There are over 60,000 hues and shades of discernable colors, which can be combined in 
limitless patterns, formed into vast arrays of shapes, and overlaid onto countless 
textures.49 This virtually endless potential stands in stark contrast to the limits of “linear, 
and irreversible chain of words in verbal language.”50 Saint-Martin describes the singular 
unit of visual communication to be the “colorme,” which when considering the biology of 
the human eye, must be large enough to be perceived, but small enough to “permit an 
efficient realization.”51 The colorme may vary within the defined limits of size with the 
limitless set of colors, shapes, and textures to provide a wide range of visual stimuli. 
Single colormes may then be combined or grouped to convey a vast amount of 
information, often in a nonlinear fashion. Single colormes can be constructed to convey 
                                                 
45 Dictionary.com, s.v. “Semiotics,” accessed June 12, 2016, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
semiotics?s=t. 
46 John Baines, “Communication and Display: The Integration of Early Egyptian Art and Writing,” 
Antiquity 63, no. 240 (September 1989): 471–82. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Fernande Saint-Martin, Semiotics of Visual Language (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1990). 
49 Ibid., 3. 
50 Saint-Martin, Semiotics of Visual Language. 
51 Ibid., 6. 
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the equivalent of an entire written passage.52 For the purposes of this thesis, Saint-
Martin’s single colorme will be described as a symbol. 
Gitelman and Jackson state that “data are mobilized graphically.”53 Symbols then 
can become representations of complex underlying data. The manner in which 
symbolized data is presented lends credence to its perceived authenticity and 
objectivity.54 Kennedy et al. argue four conventions are required to achieve these 
perceptions: Two-dimensional viewpoints, clean layouts, geometric shapes and lines, and 
the inclusion of data sources.55 They further define the term “convention” within 
semiotics as “a symbolic or social practice that is shared, readily understood, and widely 
accepted by members of a cultural group.”56 These conventions create context for the 
interpretation of symbols for members of a cultural group. 
Technology has always played a role in the recording and delivery of symbols. 
Early depictions of contextualized data occurred in the 1600s. Kennedy et al. note the 
arrival of the color printing press as the pivotal moment in the portrayal of symbolized 
data, allowing the creation of complex colored geographic maps and cartograms.57 Color 
has long been a powerful tool for differentiating symbols and the technology for 
delivering full-color symbolized information has continued to advance through the 
centuries. While society may now consider a full-color high definition display to be 
commonplace and relatively unremarkable, the technology that makes such a display 
possible continues to change the manner in which we communicate.  
                                                 
52 Saint-Martin, Semiotics of Visual Language. 
53 Steven Jackson and Lisa Gitelman, “Raw Data” Is an Oxymoron (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2013). 
54 Helen Kennedy et al., “The Work That Visualization Conventions Do,” Information, 
Communication & Society 19, no. 6 (2016): 715–35. 
55 Ibid., 723. 
56 Ibid., 717. 
57 Ibid., 718. 
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The visual representations of cartography include lines, points, and polygonal 
shapes.58 Whysel states cartography can and should be adapted for use by emergency 
responders to identify geospatial entities relevant to them.59 Cartographic depictions of 
items specifically selected to create context for a specific population are among the 
“cartographic pragmatics” of the map.60 Cartographic pragmatics for first responders can 
include a wide range of information that may be general in nature, like traffic patterns or 
locations of medical facilities, to highly specific information like access and egress points 
for a specific structure. Maps used for emergency response require careful design to 
ensure accuracy and clarity.61 Within these maps, symbols must be used to depict the 
location of features relevant to the response context. As the technology allowing 
interactive mapping for first response has advanced, many early adopters have 
undertaken efforts to develop symbols useful for this purpose, leaving a large range of 
unique and varying symbols for emergency management nationwide.62 Whysel notes the 
efforts of Pennsylvania State University in cooperation with the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) to develop a common useful emergency management symbols 
set to eliminate the interoperation confusion that results from inconsistent symbology.63 
The varying range of developed symbols sets for emergency response and 
management have been identified as an interoperability weakness nationwide.64 The 
2006 ANSI standard developed a national symbol set but it has been poorly received 
within the response community.65 ANSI finds a very low adoption rate of the symbol set 
                                                 
58 Norreen Y. Whysel, “Semiotics, Mapping, and Emergencies” (slides, semiotics web and 







64 Anthony C. Robinson, Alan M. MacEachren, and Robert E. Roth, “Challenges for Map Symbol 
Standardization in Crisis Management,” in 7th International ISCRAM Conference, Seattle, WA (University 




within responder communities and ongoing development of unique symbols outside of 
their standard. A survey of California firefighters found only seven of the 28 symbols 
developed for firefighting events produced a comprehension rating better than 75 
percent.66  
ANSI symbols are point symbols, meaning they identify a single resource as a 
point, and when placed in the context of a map they can be correlated to a location. 
Robinson, MacEachren, and Roth surveyed those communities of responders who were 
using resource symbols but had opted against the ANSI 415 standard to identify their 
preferred symbols set. Responder communities queried included the U.S. Coast Guard, 
the U.S. Fire Administration, the National Operations Center, FEMA, and the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office. In all cases, respondents stated they were using an “in house” 
mix of custom-designed symbols sets. Robinson, McEachren, and Roth report 
respondents did not find the ANSI standard “matched their operational perspective.”67 
The ANSI symbols could not provide the needed cartographic pragmatics; in other 
words, they failed to provide needed context. 
G. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN NETWORK-CENTRIC, 
GEOLOCATED MANEUVER WARFARE 
The term “fog of war” is generally attributable to Prussian Soldier Carl von 
Clausewitz, although he never used the phrase.68 Wartime fog is described as having 
several component parts, many of which are also directly attributable to emergency 
response operations. Clausewitz forges a term to encompass the difficulties of waging 
war: Friction, which he defines as “the force that makes the apparently easy so 
difficult.”69 The components of friction include uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and 
                                                 
66 Robinson, MacEachren, and Roth, “Challenges for Map Symbol Standardization in Crisis 
Management.” 
67 Ibid. 
68 Paul C. Hudson and Jeffrey A. Rzasa, “Knowledge Visualizations: A Tool to Achieve Optimized 
Operational Decision Making and Data Integration” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45877. 
69 U.S. Marine Corps Staff, Warfighting, first printing (Provo, UT: Renaissance Classics, 2012). 
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complexity,70 all of which are also present in emergency response. The parallels between 
warfare and emergency response are numerous. In generations past, it might have been 
defensible to say that responders did not face an organized enemy combatant, but that too 
is changing. Today’s responders face natural and man-made disasters, as well as 
organized murderous enemies of domestic tranquility. 
United States Marine Corps doctrine identifies uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and 
complexity as inherent parts of warfare, and each can be also be found in homeland 
security operations. Uncertainty in warfare includes the entire unknown, including those 
about your enemy, the environment, and even friendly forces.71 Domestic responders 
face similar uncertainty with every alarm, from construction uncertainty in structural fires 
to behavioral uncertainty in law enforcement actions. Fluidity in warfare is the ever 
evolving battlespace, often unique when viewed singly, but related to events unfolding 
globally.72 Responders face fluid events that can evolve into larger or multiple incidents. 
Racial tension in one part of the country may create unique but related homeland security 
events in other parts of the city, state, or country.  
Disorder is described as an inherent characteristic of war, caused by unclear or 
incomplete information, miscommunication, and unforeseen events and 
miscommunication.73 Domestic response inherently faces all those same obstacles, as 
cases of each are well documented in all types and scales of homeland security incidents. 
Complexity in warfare is a result of the myriad of working parts, supported not by a 
single consciousness but by the consciousness of many, many combatants. The various 
elements of a warfighting force assigned myriad responsibilities must coordinate and 
communicate large amounts of data to interoperate effectively to achieve an objective.74 
The mitigation of homeland security incidents is also driven by the cognition of a myriad 
of minds, despite the routine presence of a command structure. This complexity is 
                                                 
70 U.S. Marine Corps Staff, Warfighting, 3–8. 
71 Ibid., 4. 
72 Ibid., 5. 
73 Ibid., 6. 
74 Ibid., 7. 
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compounded as the incident scale grows, as domestic responder silos do not benefit from 
a national executive board of joint leadership as found in the military’s Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Complexity abounds in the domestic response arena. 
Armed forces were, perhaps, the original customers of contextually relevant map 
symbols. Maneuver warfare, by definition, requires those in command to have a well-
developed understanding of their resources, the location of those resources, and the best 
possible estimation of the same data for enemy forces. Simply collecting the right 
information does not create situational awareness. Driesslein said, “to have situational 
awareness, the right information must be delivered to the right people, at the right time, in 
the right way.”75 Military systems have advanced in this manner, attempting to connect, 
filter and layer information in a way that creates an immediately relevant context for 
warfighters. Driesslein goes on to state, “Good situational awareness is highly context 
dependent.”76 Developing and reporting on battlefield situational awareness has 
progressed in tandem with the development of information sharing technologies. To 
facilitate the best possible common operating picture and battlefield situational 
awareness, the U.S. armed forces today utilize a dazzling array of scalable information 
networks across their geographically and contextually diverse battlespaces. Despite all 
the advances in communication technology, very much like Napoleon’s ancient 
command post, often a map is still needed to provide context in these complex 
information systems. 
Data and communications networks are critical to military operations, so much so 
that they are carried into battle as a matter of routine. The continuous presence and 
constant advancement of communications networks in the battlespace have led to the 
term network-centric warfare,77 which suggests the growing dependency of warfighters 
on information systems. Baskarada identifies a cascade of advantages created by 
                                                 
75 Jonathan Clarke Driesslein, “Scalable Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) to Enhance Situational 
Awareness in Distributed Small Unit Operations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 
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76 Ibid., 9. [emphasis added] 
77 Sasa Baskarada, “Towards a Semiotic Information Position Framework for Network Centric 
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network-centric warfare. Firstly, “a robustly networked force improves information 
sharing,” which enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; 
secondly, “shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization.”78 These factors 
combined dramatically improve mission effectiveness.79  
Military communications networks vary in size and scope, and from one branch 
of service to another. Networks scale in size from global satellites to vehicle-mounted, 
providing a range of resolutions. A wide variety of decision support systems run on these 
networks to improve the situational awareness of decision makers. Information on several 
of these decision support systems resides in the public domain including Blue Force 
Tracker (BFT-2), Link 16, and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 
(FBCB2). 
The U.S. Army Catalog of weapons systems describes FBCB2 as an automated 
tool for dissemination of locations of friendly and known adversarial forces, as well as 
graphical depictions of commander’s intentions.80 FBCB2 deployment is dependent on 
the presence of several other systems in the battlespace but in particular the Warfighter 
Information Network—Tactical (WIN-T), which is a field deployed wireless information 
network consisting of a range of wireless technologies.81 FBCB2 is a land-based platform 
that locates resources, symbolized and overlaid on a series of tactical maps. FBCB2 
required vehicle-mounted hardware; thus, the resolution of distributed resources does not 
extend beyond vehicle to smaller resources like dismounted soldiers. 
The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy operate a networked decision support system 
known as Link 16. Its purpose is to manage the battlespace and maintain “shared 
situational awareness in operations.”82 Link 16 is described as a “system of systems” 
capable of dividing and networking the battlespace into up to 127 different ad-hoc data 
                                                 
78 Baskarada, “Towards a Semiotic Information Position Framework for Network Centric Warfare.”  
79 Ibid. 
80 United States Army, Weapon Systems 2012 America’s Army: The Strength of the Nation (Arlington, 
VA: United States Army, 2012). 
81 Ibid., 316–320. 
82 Myron Hura et al., Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235.html.  
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networks that communicate with shared servers for geolocation of resources on land, sea, 
and air.83 While the information must contain some Z-axis information for altitude, Link 
16 also utilizes two-dimensional tactical battlespace maps with symbols overlaid for 
situational awareness data. Link 16 is also limited to being vehicle-borne, typically by 
aircraft, and does not include a resolution for resources as small as unmounted soldiers.84 
Both FBCB2 and Link 16 have been designed to utilize wireless radio networks 
comprised of ground-mobile base stations (in the case of FBCB2), seaborne radio 
platforms, airborne radio platforms, and satellite networks in orbit utilizing a range of 
bandwidth spectrum. The systems share a common purpose, to share situational 
awareness data including identification, location, activity, and status of a wide array of 
forces deployed in and around the battlespace. The complex array of potential 
participants includes forces from the various U.S. military branches, as well as the 
various branches of allied nations and intelligence about opposing forces. This 
complexity is closely mirrored by the vast array of responder groups that might engage in 
mitigation of domestic homeland security incidents.  
Hardware requirements for both FBCB2 and Link 16 are too large for man-
portable utilization. While outside the scope of this thesis, it is worthwhile to note that 
both the U.S. military and the various responder communities have need of low-cost, low 
profile man-portable situational awareness data to track individual human resources. 
Currently in the research and development phase at the Naval Postgraduate School is a 
mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) and associated hardware for tracking situational 
awareness data within small unit operations.85 Driesslein’s research has found a man-
portable lightweight sensor network connected to a low-cost computer known as 
Raspberry Pi that can collect and transmit data relevant at the squad level. Driesslein’s 
system in development is an answer to the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency’s (DARPA) Squad X project, which calls for solutions to squad-level problems 
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like precision engagement, non-kinetic engagement, squad sensing, and squad 
autonomy.86 
While the objectives for military squads are set in the combat context, their tasks 
can be easily correlated to those of domestic responders. Squad objectives described by 
DARPA include resource optimization and synchronization of squad activities down to 
the individual rifleman.87 The Squad X project seeks to enable networked information 
sharing down to the single human resource, so all warfighters in the field have access to 
current situational awareness data. These needs directly correspond to the needs of 
domestic responders during homeland security incidents of all scales. Situational 
awareness sharing down to single responder resolution is outside the scope of this thesis 
but will be an essential part of future research and development for the DHS. All these 
technologies depend on location orientation and situational awareness data exchange over 
a wireless network, set in the context of their area of operations, overlaid on a tactical 
map. Development of effective symbols capable of conveying the context of this dynamic 
environment is essential for military and civilian operations in network-centric 
environments. 
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III. CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS FOR SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS SHARING 
A. COMMUNICATING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN THE 
HOMELAND 
Homeland security responders face many of the same challenges as warfighters, 
yet the diverse nature of American emergency response networks has produced a 
patchwork of methodologies and technologies for managing situational awareness. There 
are over 27,000 fire jurisdictions,88 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies,89 
and over 9,500 emergency medical service provider services not affiliated with a fire 
department (third services)90 nationally. There are also myriad federal response assets 
managed by the DHS’s 22 subordinate agencies, as well as National Guard assets in each 
of the 50 states. The potential for complexity of mixed jurisdictional assets at any given 
homeland security incident is difficult to overstate. When compared with the four 
branches of the armed services, it is easy to understand how efforts at developing 
situational awareness might be more diverse and less consistent domestically than within 
the DOD. 
1. Land-Based Mobile Radio Networks 
The earliest electronic communications came in the form of the telegraph, which 
connected humans electronically for the first time. Obviously, that was a cumbersome 
system of communication but when your alternatives were U.S. post or Pony Express, the 
telegraph was an enormous advance. Wiring a telegraph was limited to simplex 
communications: one sender while receivers remained silent during delivery. 
Interestingly, despite the magnitude of advances in electronic communications, the vast 
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majority of homeland security responders are still subject to that same limitation. A 
modern land-based mobile radio network in use by emergency services can come in a 
variety of very high frequency (VHF) or 800 megahertz (mHz) configurations with 
trunking technology and meet all the current requirements for narrow-band wireless 
communications; but one critical feature that does not change is the nature of simplex 
voice exchange: One talker, multiple listeners. Anyone wishing to interject information 
into a simplex radio exchange must wait for a break in the conversation for their turn to 
speak. 
These radio networks are a patchwork of systems that often butt up to or overlap 
one another, but are often unable to exchange information between them.91 Homeland 
security responders have grown to depend on these networks for situational awareness 
data exchange, with doctrine for the conveyance of “short reports”92 and situational 
updates that are generally described by national policy but often vary wildly across the 
vast array of jurisdictions. The Model Procedures Guide for Fire Fighting Incidents has 
extensive elaborations about the manner in which users will identify themselves by radio, 
the format of messages, and the order in which users will prioritize themselves.93 Despite 
extensive guidance on the subject, the failure of voice communications via radio is 
attributed to firefighter injuries and deaths on a continual basis.94 Still, a great deal of 
national emphasis is placed on improving voice radio communications technologies that 
will always be limited to simplex communications,95 and while voice communications 
will surely always play some role during homeland security incidents, this thesis suggests 
a better communications tool. Homeland security responders have a need for a vast array 
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of information to create situational awareness and the limits of land-based mobile radio 
networks create a bottleneck in that information flow. 
2. Cellular Networks 
The advent of cellular telephones opened a new era in voice communications for 
homeland security responders. Cellular networks delivered duplex communications to 
emergency workers in the field. For the first time, responders were able to have an open 
conversation via cellular telephone, which allowed both speakers to exchange 
information without the linear wait of simplex conversations. Known as duplex 
communication, it is a more effective and comfortable modality, but there are also 
limitations to the use of cellular communications in homeland security response. 
Responders working at geographically diverse locations across an incident scene 
routinely need situational awareness data to be shared across the entire incident 
simultaneously, which is not practical with cellular voice across large user groups. Voice 
teleconferencing is an example of duplex communications across larger user groups and 
is an excellent illustration of some of the pitfalls: Many users must be muted or silent 
while information is exchanged; otherwise, the volume of voice data becomes 
unintelligible noise, and as more users are added, the more this problem amplifies.96  
Cellular networks are currently private, for-profit enterprises. Homeland security 
responders access them as paying clients of a commercial service, and as such, are often 
treated as any other customer would be. Cellular networks have limitations on the number 
of concurrent users and are known to fail when overloaded with traffic.97 The United 
Kingdom has managed this reality with legislation requiring priority access to cellular 
networks for first responders, generally known as “access overload control” (ACCOLC) 
legislation.98 Despite the application of ACCOLC laws, when stressed by national 
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security incidents British cellular networks are still known to fail responders, requiring 
backup communication plans.99 The United States is considering ACCOLC as part of a 
federal legislation package for first responders but there are currently no federal 
requirements for such; any ACCOLC granted by cellular carriers in America is done so 
as a result of state legislation or on a voluntary basis.100 The nature of the commercial 
cellular network is such that it provides a valuable tool to responders but is unreliable 
when needed most. 
3. Wireless Data Networks 
Wireless data networks followed cellular voice networks, utilizing much of the 
same infrastructure. While not to the extent that military forces have begun to develop 
network-centric warfare on the backbone of proprietary military field mobile systems like 
WIN-T, homeland security responders have begun to utilize these wireless data networks 
to create elements of a network-centric response. With no national standards, these 
elements are developing independent of one another and may result in the same 
patchwork of incompatible systems that plague the homeland today. This is 
unsatisfactory and does not meet the national effort towards improved interoperability 
between the various responder silos. 
Wireless data networks are subject to many of the same vulnerabilities of cellular 
voice networks, including overload and failure during homeland security incidents. 
However, the value of escaping simplex and duplex voice communications exceeds the 
risk of system failure and most homeland security wireless data networks rely on 
commercial infrastructure. This relationship is effective while the networks are running 
smoothly and there are no impacts to responder operations. Ever-increasing consumer 
demand for data does create a competitive environment for physically limited wireless 
bandwidth. With little profit in supplying wireless data to emergency services, there are 
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cases where connectivity is cited as a principle cause for 911 emergency dispatching 
system failures when those systems depend on cellular data connectivity.101 Wireless 
data providers have no mandated incentive to address the connectivity issues of public 
safety over any other consumer groups, and so public safety connectivity largely resides 
at the mercy of a for-profit corporation. Relying upon commercial cellular networks for 
situational awareness during significant homeland security incidents has proven 
problematic at best and dangerous at worst.102 As does the military, domestic responders 
require a resilient wireless data network that can be depended on to provide reliable data 
coverage under adverse conditions. Continuity of service is the only way the advantages 
of networked systems can be fully realized during significant homeland security 
incidents. As in warfare, friction impacts emergency operations and all its component 
parts; a wireless network for responders must be engineered to reduce friction. 
4. FirstNet 
In 2012, the Middle-Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act became law. 
Contained within the act was the first effort toward the funding and creation of a 
nationwide, interoperable, hardened broadband network for use by homeland security 
responders.103 Communications interoperability failures during the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks and again during Hurricane Katrina are routinely cited as the driving 
impetus behind the legislative push for such a network.104 FirstNet was formed in the act 
to build, deploy, operate and maintain a national public safety broadband network 
(NPSBN) upon which interoperable software could run seamlessly nationwide.105 In 
general, the FirstNet system was originally envisioned to be a disaster-hardened wireless 
network that reached all corners of the nation, including dense urban centers and rural 
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areas, independent of any commercial network(s) available in the same markets.106 
Funding for the creation of the NPSBN is provided through the auction of publicly-held 
electromagnetic spectrum bandwidth rights to private enterprise.107 The act added an 
additional 10 mHz of bandwidth within the 700 mHz spectrum dedicated to public safety 
purposes. This was in addition to the 14 mHz of spectrum already allocated in that 
bandwidth bringing the total available 700 mHz spectrum to 24 mHz. The 700 mHz 
range is valuable as it is an effective bandwidth for the broadcast of wireless broadband 
data and is highly desirable to private network providers.108 
Since the inception of the original plan, some have questioned the sufficiency of 
this allocation to meet the current and future spectrum needs of public safety. 
Congresswoman Laura Richardson (CA) is the chairwoman of the U.S. House Homeland 
Security Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response. 
She held hearings on the topic in July 2010 and received testimony from several experts 
who suggested that a dedicated independent wireless network may not be the best model 
for public safety.109 Some public safety officials reported concerns about network 
capacity with such an allocation, yet a study by the Federal Communications 
Commission reported that when the new spectrum allocation was summed with existing 
public safety spectrum, there was over 97 mHz now dedicated solely to that purpose and 
represents over 25 times more spectrum per user than is available to private service 
subscribers.110 
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Several alternate models for the creation of an NPSBN have been considered 
since FirstNet was authorized, including the possibility of some or all public safety data 
being routed through an expanded private infrastructure with priority access, similar to 
the ACCOLC features of British traffic on their privately-held networks.111 The technical 
and policy feasibility of adequate priority access is the subject of current debate and no 
decision has been reached on the exact design of the NPSBN at the time of this writing. 
However, it is clear that a new, hardened wireless network dedicated to homeland 
security functions is on the horizon and supports the continuation of efforts to develop 
interoperable public safety tools for use on such a network. The ability to communicate 
exponentially larger volumes of situational awareness data on an NPSBN when compared 
to the limitations of voice on legacy land-based mobile radio networks or cell phones 
requires the development of a consistent and easily understood language for 
interoperation in the new network-centric response environment. Critical to this thesis is 
the understanding that regardless of the final configuration of FirstNet, it will provide a 
resilient backbone for the communication of interoperable situational awareness data 
among responders but no part of the project addresses how that communication will 
occur or what form it will take. 
5. Broadband Tools 
Wireless broadband networks allow vastly larger amounts of data to travel 
through the same electromagnetic spectrum than traditional radio networks. While 
spectrum alone does not determine network capacity, the presence of a wireless 
infrastructure dedicated to public safety opens the floodgates for information flow within 
homeland security workspaces. Currently, the reliability issues described for private data 
networks hamper responders and retard the utilization of information tools commonly 
used by consumers. While there is steady advancement of utilization of wireless 
technology in public safety, it is sporadic and inconsistent. National policy does not yet 
address the methods by which increasingly networked homeland security responders will 
utilize the improved rate of information flow.  
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When considering the impact of broadband on a response force that is accustomed 
to sharing situational awareness information via verbal reports on simplex or duplex 
voice systems, the possibility of equipping responders with larger volumes of vastly 
better decision-making information is striking. National efforts today should be focused 
on methods of representing, sorting, filtering, and layering that information so the 
network-centric response can realize its potential without overloading users. Just as 
Driesslein states for warfighters, the mere presence of information does not create 
situational awareness; useful data must be delivered to the right people in the right time 
to create it.112 While new digital tools will be available to future, broadband-equipped 
homeland security responders, it is critical that they are developed in such a way that they 
apply Driesslein’s objectives. 
The bandwidth provided by developing wireless data networks, combined with 
the information traffic management of a computer network, opens a new era in public 
safety communications. While many efforts are underway to develop tools for 
communicating situational awareness, they are occurring in pockets, with no national 
standards on how that will occur. There is currently no national guidance on responder 
use of streaming video, video conferencing or sharing live closed-circuit video feeds with 
field units. There is also a plethora of externally developed data feeds with information 
that is relevant to responders like traffic, weather, social media, and more. If managed 
correctly, much of this data can be used to add context to homeland security events, but if 
mismanaged, it threatens to create information overload. 
B. MAPPING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
To build situational awareness, responders must answer three essential questions 
that bear a striking resemblance to General Dunn’s questions for warfighters: “Where am 
I?” “Where are my forces and other friendly forces?” and “where is the enemy and what 
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is the best route to attack him?”113 With very little imagination, these situational 
awareness questions from warfare can be adapted to a homeland security response: 
Where am I? Where are other responders? Where is the problem, and what is the best 
route to solving it? Whether it be warfare or a homeland security incident, a map is a 
foundational tool upon which the answers are developed.114 
Maps depict features of the environment graphically in a way that readers can 
orient themselves within for location awareness. Maps come in all forms, from depictions 
of the continents to floorplans of buildings to the layout of biological systems within a 
single cell. Digital maps display these same graphical depictions in an environment that 
make them more user-friendly, allowing the user to pan and zoom and overlay layers of 
data that can be related to specific locations on the map. These very sophisticated 
mapping tools are known as GIS and have become so compact and user-friendly that they 
are a part of most modern portable devices and can be used by laypersons with ease.  
Google Maps is a fine example of a user-friendly GIS with selectable layers for 
the creation of manageable situational awareness information. Layers include streets, 
aerial imagery, traffic, and data points like attractions and specific addresses. Users can 
change the focus of their view of Google Maps by changing the assumptions about their 
mode of transport: vehicle, bicycle, or pedestrian. American smartphone users now take 
these capabilities for granted, but equal services are slow to arrive for homeland security 
responders. Publicly-available mapping tools can be accessed by responders but there is 
currently no option to change the focus of the map view to providing public safety 
specific context. Several commercial, non-profit, and government vendors are attempting 
to fill this void by developing GIS-based tools for sharing incident information that 
answer the three essential questions of situational awareness. 
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The foundation of a GIS is a map that makes reference to the real world, with the 
placement of tabular data within the map extent to relate data to real-world geography. 
Any tabular data that can be related to a specific place can be displayed by a GIS. The 
scales of various GIS maps can range from architectural to global, with data overlaid to 
depict things like population demographics or the location of all street signs within an 
area; the sorting, filtering, and layering of data within a GIS produce unique views for 
users.115 The most critical issue addressed by any GIS is what to represent and how to 
represent it.116 National policy has not yet answered these two questions for homeland 
security responders. 
Data can be displayed on a GIS map in two formats, rasters and vectors.117 Most 
GIS maps in use today use a combination of both, and further break vectored data into 
points, lines, and polygons. Typically, vectored data is overlaid upon a raster map to 
provide the best representation of reality. Several techniques can be applied to simplify 
the features of a GIS map for ease of understanding and to avoid information overload. 
These generalization techniques include simplification, smoothing, collapse, aggregation, 
amalgamation, merging, refinement, exaggeration, enhancement, and displacement.118 
While all these principles have been defined in GIS science, they represent a series of 
cognitive compromises that can vary from one application to another and largely depend 
on the intended use of the GIS. Defining these compromises will be essential for national 
policy surrounding network-centric response mapping applications. 
Critical to this thesis is the understanding of the manner in which a GIS manages 
data associated with features on the map. Behind each map feature is a table of data used 
to define the characteristics of that feature; this table is known as an attribute table.119 
Polygons are used to depict data with volume, like jurisdictional boundaries or the 
perimeters of structures. Examples of attribute data for structures depicted as a polygonal 
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shape could include things like number of stories, year built, address number, and 
virtually any other detail that can be stored in an electronic table. Line shapes in a GIS 
include things like rivers or roads and attribute data could include attributes like names, 
volumes of water flow, speed limits, and the like. Points are used to depict single location 
items with no relative volume like single address points, intersections, and locations of 
specific resources. Points are used to depict the answer to the “where am I?” question for 
resources in military systems like Link 16 or FBCB2 and homeland security applications 
like Next Generation Incident Command (NICS). Data contained in attribute tables 
defines the details of represented items, and when the data is numerical, it allows for 
complex statistical comparisons between represented features. For homeland security 
purposes, the attribute table is a critical feature of situational awareness sharing, as it 
where contextual data is stored, allowing an improved understanding of the feature and 
its relationship to other mapped features visually, with no need for verbal exchange. 
Mapped features may be represented by a host of symbols and varied endlessly 
using semiotic principles. When shared via a network, a GIS is a map-based platform for 
communicating vast volumes of location and contextual attributes, creating geolocated 
semiotic communication that occurs instantly across networked users. A GIS is not 
constrained by the push-to-talk limits of voice communication and can make use of the 
full range of human visual sensory inputs defined by semiotics. Homeland security 
responders must define best principles and practices for this new method of 
communication, so we develop a language that is easily understood by all network-
centric responders. 
C. STATE OF THE ART HOMELAND SECURITY GIS TOOLS 
1. Next Generation Incident Command 
NICS, also known as SCOUT (Situation Awareness and Collaboration Tool) in 
California State,120 is networked incident management software built around a mapping 
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tool that allows responders to collaborate in a “white board” environment.121 The 
software package was developed at the Lincoln Laboratories of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in response to a DARPA challenge.122 In partnership with Cal 
Fire, the web-based software is currently being tested for incident management of 
regional size. It is currently most commonly associated with managing wildfires in 
California but has also been tested for use on floods, special events, and hazardous 
materials incidents.123 Designed to be used in the field, NICS is dependent on a wireless 
network infrastructure to function. In most cases, it utilizes the local commercial cellular 
network but Cal Fire has also developed proprietary portable wireless networking cells 
for use in wildlands where no commercial service is available. Features of NICS display 
include situational awareness information provided via map to include the location of 
single resources and their relativity to one another. NICS utilizes other benefits of 
broadband interfaces, including live continuous group chat rooms, video conferencing, 
and layered data feeds from commercial sources.124 NICS software is currently managed 
by a not-for-profit agency called the NICS Users Group and will be offered to homeland 
security agencies at no cost. 
NICS makes extensive use of GIS map features including the ability to track 
multiple incidents, various resources by type, and then layer data in a way that is 
contextually relevant to users. The symbols set in use by NICS is an amalgamation of 
symbols sourced from a variety of places, including Department of Transportation 
vehicle placards, ANSI symbols and a range of symbols they have developed 
internally.125 It is important to note that none of the NICS symbols draw contextual data 
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from within the attribute table of the represented resource, and that resources are 
identified by various point symbols only, as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Next Generation Incident Command (SCOUT)126 
In this case, even with a legend provided, users might discern the locations of the mapped 
resources but would be unable to determine features of those units without further inquiry 
into the attribute tables of each symbol. 
2. Commercial Computer Aided-Dispatch Products 
A range of vendors provides software for emergency responders nationally. 
Common to these software products is some form of GIS mapping incorporated to 
answer continuously the essential situational awareness questions of resource location, 
their relativity, and the best method to solve the problem at hand. These software 
solutions are chosen locally, and choices vary from one jurisdiction to the next, creating 
the patchwork of software systems that lead to the interoperability issues previously 
discussed. The depiction of mapped features on these systems follows a pattern similar to 
the NICS system; a combination of symbols drawn from various industries, in 
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conjunction with some nationally standardized symbols and some proprietary symbols. 
Within these various symbols, there may be multiple varied symbols for police cars, fire 
hydrants, hazards, and building features. Each system develops a visual language unique 
unto itself. 
Tyler Technologies provides software solutions for police, fire, jail and 
emergency incident dispatching.127 Their software is advertised to improve “the sharing 
of mission-critical information.”128 Tyler’s Fire Mobile is advertised to improve 
situational awareness among responders via “high performance, easy to maintain 
maps.”129 Figure 2 is a depiction of Tyler’s Fire Mobile™ application mapping. 
 
Figure 2.  Tyler Technologies Fire Mobile Mapping 
Figure 2 depicts two mobile resources as points, with the underlying street 
network as lines. There is no applicable national standard for the depiction of a fire 
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engine or police car within these systems, so each vendor opts to display them differently. 
In this case, the symbol for either is a simple red vehicle, with a label differentiating 
between the two resource types. Please note that the Tyler product does not draw any 
contextual information from the attribute table of the features depicted, nor does it alter 
the symbols as the scale of the map changes, reducing the utility of the situational 
awareness data being conveyed. Figure 3 is a depiction of the same moment in time but at 
a wider scale of view. Without the application of cartographic conventions, cognitive 
compromises, and semiotics, it is very easy for mapping tools to become a blur of 
information with extremely limited utility. 
 
Figure 3.  Tyler Technologies Fire Mobile Cartographic Conventions 
TriTech Software Systems™ also offers a suite of computer-aided dispatch 
(CAD) products for sale. Similar to Tyler, they have chosen to integrate a GIS to help 
answer the “where” questions of situational awareness. TriTech has opted to partner with 
Google to embed Google Maps™ as their mapping tool rather than attempt to build their 
own.130 There are several advantages to this strategy including the synergy between two 
                                                 
130 “Google Maps Interface,” 2012, http://ledyardct.iqm2.com/Citizens/FileOpen.aspx?Type=4&ID= 
2293.  
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software systems, and the broad base of familiarity between consumers and Google 
products. Figure 4 depicts a fictional incident utilizing TriTech mapping software. 
 
Figure 4.  TriTech Mapping Solution Utilizing Google Maps131 
Visible in the TriTech image is a layer of Google Earth™ satellite imagery with 
Google Streets™ overlaid. Much like NICS and Tyler software, the symbols representing 
various homeland security incidents and resources are unique to the system and visitors 
to the system would not necessarily be able to interpret the map easily. It is also 
important to note that homeland security features depicted in this example do not add 
context to each feature by drawing information from the feature’s attribute table. The 
point symbols used as examples are able to provide location and relativity information 
and are differentiated by various shapes and colors, but little additional situational 
awareness can be gleaned from the depiction without further query of the attributes of 
each feature. 
                                                 
131 Source: Ibid. 
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3. Google Maps for Government 
Google provides its mapping tool to other software vendors as a subscription 
service for vendors creating application/program interfaces like TriTech. The company is 
also developing its own standalone map-based incident management tool for 
government.132 Google boasts that its tools allow collaboration among silos and instant 
sharing of situational awareness data, much like the CAD software vendors. Figure 5 
depicts a Google Maps for Government view of a flooding incident. 
 
Figure 5.  Google Maps for Government133 
This depiction of a hypothetical flooding incident is utilizing a Google Street™ 
map with overlays of flooded areas and point symbols for emergency shelters. The 
Google product opens an abbreviated attribute table when the point is selected, offering 
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contextually relevant information to responders, in this instance the maximum capacity 
and current population of the selected shelter. Please note the symbol for shelter is 
proprietary and the color chosen to represent its status is an example of using semiotics to 
provide context. Figure 6 depicts the addition of more contextual information  by 
differentiating colors. This is a practical example of conveying context by varying the 
semiotics of the symbol based on data contained in the attribute table, allowing rapid 
dissemination of situational awareness about shelter locations, access, capacities, and 
current headcounts. 
 
Figure 6.  Google Maps for Government with Context Added134 
                                                 
134 Source: “Mapping Solutions for Government: Google Maps for Government.” 
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D. GAPS IN CAPABILITIES 
1. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) evaluated national 
emergency response capabilities in 2011, reviewing after-action incident reports, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, and interviews with subject matter 
experts from communities of various sizes.135 As was frequently documented in the 
military literature for warfare, PNNL’s first recognized responder need is for situational 
awareness, to create an environment for effective decision-making. PNNL differentiated 
between routine and large-scale operations but identified improved communications as a 
need for incidents of all scales. A particularly notable communications capability gap is 
the lack of readily deployable wireless infrastructure for use in large-scale events where 
domestic power and private wireless networks are overloaded or unavailable. States 
should have access to military-style deployable communications hardware similar to 
WIN-T. 
PNNL identified divided gaps in situational awareness capabilities into three 
categories: dynamic situations, resource status, and geographic visualization.136 Clearly, 
the three are interrelated and are simply another expression of the three fundamental 
situational awareness questions asked on the battlefield. The need for developing this 
information, storing it, and sharing it with counterparts as operational periods change is a 
key finding of PNNL research. PNNL interviewees felt collaboration between 
organizations prior to homeland security incidents was the best tool for combatting the 
challenges to creating a shared situational awareness between organizations; this 
collaboration creates relationships of trust and helps define a common incident 
language.137 Developing a national common incident language for shared situational 
awareness is essential for homeland security. Examples used in this thesis depict 
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regionalized and inconsistent efforts to develop such a language. The need for a common 
visual language is clear. 
2. ANSI Homeland Security Mapping Standard  
The American National Standards Institute, in collaboration with the International 
Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS), has developed ANSI 
INCITS 415-2006 Homeland Security Mapping Standard (ANSI INCITS 415) in an 
effort to meet this need for a national common language for sharing situational awareness 
via map.138 As virtually all the military and civilian situational awareness systems 
studied involve the extensive use of a GIS, these symbols were developed for digital 
mapping. The intended audience for this standard is the emergency management and first 
responder communities.139 
The symbols contained within ANSI INCITS 415 have proven problematic and 
have experienced a poor adoption rate since their release in 2006.140 The ANSI symbols 
set are all point symbols, intended to be applied to resources located at coordinates as 
well as applied in general to phenomena that may be distributed across a large area. No 
guidance is offered in the creation of polygons to describe wide-area events. The point 
symbols are divided into four categories: incidents by type, natural events, operations, 
and infrastructure.141 There are three basic shapes for the four categories, and each 
symbol can be modified by a colored frame. No accommodation is provided for those 
items that may have geographic areas like incident boundaries or areas of operation. 
Figure 7 depicts the three basic shapes and the four possible frame modifiers. 
                                                 
138 American National Standards Institute, Homeland Security Mapping Standard—Point Symbology 
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 47 
 
Figure 7.  ANSI INCITS 415-2006 Point Symbology Schema142 
Figure 8 depicts an example of an operation point symbol for an ambulance, and 
the four frames that can be used to modify the symbol describing its state of functionality. 
                                                 
142 Source: Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) Homeland Security Working Group, 
Homeland Security Mapping Standard Point Symbology for Emergency Management, 6. 
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Figure 8.  ANSI INCITS 425-2006 Point Symbol Variations143 
Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate significant shortcomings in the standard. First is the 
black-and-white guidance document itself, with a textual description of color. In a full-
color world, the guidance document should depict the colors intended for use rather than 
describe them. Division of the symbols set into four categories is useful, as it allows for 
sorting and filtering by data type; however, the symbols set opens up the opportunity for 
confusion by using only three symbols to depict four categories. Additionally, “incidents” 
typically occupy one or more geographies with physical area, rather than points. Finally, 
it is critical to note that the point symbols for resources, as depicted in Figure 8, do not 
draw information from the attributes of the resource being featured, and thus, do not 
create much useful context for the reader.  
Robinson, McEachren, and Roth have studied the low organizational adoption 
rates for ANSI INCITS 415 by interviewing subject matter experts (SMEs) from a variety 
of homeland security agencies and disciplines. Their study concluded that most SMEs 
were familiar with the standard but typically only utilized a small number of the symbols 
and often with custom local modifications.144 SME comments regarding the standard 
symbols suggest they are not organized in a useful manner, are too complicated, or are 
not relevant to their individual areas of operation.145 In summary, the ANSI INCITS 415 
symbols fail to provide a common, interoperable language for use in emergency 
operation. The failure is not a result of poor symbols selection, but rather the lack of 
applied semiotic principles and the lack of useful attribute information to assist in the 
creation of context. 
                                                 
143 Source: Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) Homeland Security Working Group, 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS TOOLS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO CIVILIAN 
USE 
A. COMPARISON OF DOD AND DHS ACTIVITIES AND INFORMATION 
NEEDS 
It is impossible to ignore the similarities between the situational awareness needs 
of the various branches of the DOD and homeland security responders. Both face 
similarly high stakes: American lives hang in the balance, there can be vast social and 
economic impacts as a result of actions taken, and organization of resources must occur 
across a broad area under the most challenging of circumstances. Carl von Clausewitz 
made the observation that “everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is 
difficult.”146 This simple conception about warfare is equally true of homeland security 
incidents.  
Armed forces in action manage violence in an effort to impose American will on 
enemies. Warfighters face many challenges in this endeavor and they are best described 
in the Marine Corps doctrinal book Warfighting. The Marines state that the clash of wills 
on the battlefield inherently creates friction, which can be created by many physical 
things including enemy action, weather, terrain, or simply chance.147 However, friction 
can also be caused by human miscalculation and confusion resulting from poorly defined 
goals, miscommunication, complex plans, or unclear commands. The Marine Corps feels 
friction is a result of warfare being a human endeavor and will, therefore, always be 
present on the battlefield. It is their intention to manage friction as a matter of course and 
work to be an effective fighting force despite the presence of friction in every action they 
take.148 The confusion resulting from frictional forces is often described as “the fog of 
war,” a term often ascribed to von Clausewitz.149 
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American responders historically have not faced organized, heavily armed 
enemies like those faced by American soldiers. Law enforcement has traditionally 
involved single perpetrators or organized crime for profit within the homeland. 
Firefighters have faced a mindless enemy intent on destroying lives and property, but not 
in an intentional and willful way. Emergency medical services personnel are trained to 
manage medical crises and traumatic injuries associated with human health and activities 
of daily living. State and federal response assets have been organized around the 
management of natural disasters and other unintentional events that cannot be managed at 
the local level. Unfortunately, all these roles are changing as America’s enemies diversify 
and find new ways to attack the homeland. The scope and threats of terrorism were 
redefined on September 11, 2001, and continue to evolve. Currently, homeland security 
responders still face their traditional foes but have been forced to adapt to the evolution 
of terrorism and the militarization of criminal behavior. Police officers face military-
grade weapons and tactics and must learn to respond in kind.150 Recent attacks in Dallas, 
Texas and Paris, France illustrate the evolving roles of firefighters and emergency 
medical services personnel who must learn to manage large volumes of afflicted patients 
across incident sites that are large and geographically diverse while under the threat of 
ongoing violence. America’s responders increasingly face the same friction-driven fog as 
American soldiers on the battlefield. Examining how armed forces manage this fog is a 
necessary endeavor for responders. 
The fog caused by friction must be overcome with a variety of tools. Driesslein 
suggests that network-centric warfare is an important and developing tool for 
management of confusion through better information sharing.151 In 2001, the DOD 
identified network-centric warfare as a key tool for battlefield awareness in a report to 
Congress and described four tenets of the network-centric battlespace:152 
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• A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 
• Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information 
and shared situational awareness. 
• Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization. 
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.153 
These tenets describe the value of networked data on the American battlefield, but the 
similarities between military information needs and those of civilian responders cannot 
be overstated, forcing civilian responders to consider the need for defining a network-
centric response. Development of such a response is well underway as described in 
Chapter III. For the purposes of this thesis, we will consider the four tenets of network-
centric warfare as being perfectly applicable to the homeland security response 
communities. 
Warfighting describes other attributes of war that translate to civilian response. 
“Uncertainty” is described as pervasive and applies to almost every aspect of combat 
from weather to enemy intentions.154 While a portion of uncertainty must always be 
governed by chance, the effects of uncertainty can be reduced by applying risk 
management principles.155 This is true on the battlefield and in the homeland security 
workspace. Soldiers may develop flexibility in mission planning and train extensively on 
strategy and tactics so their responses to uncertainty become predictable. These same risk 
management strategies are applied by homeland security responders to reduce uncertainty 
during incidents. Firefighters and police officers train extensively so their actions become 
predictable during uncertainty. Responders pre-plan their responses to known threats 
within their communities to reduce risk further and eliminate uncertainty. 
Fluidity and disorder are two more attributes of warfare156 that also appear during 
homeland security incidents. Hudson and Rzasa describe a human cognitive limit to the 
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number of variables an individual can assimilate, with the deterioration of situational 
awareness occurring when that limit is reached.157 The fluidity and disorder of 
information on the battlefield create a “saturated data pool that is unorganized, irrelevant, 
and redundant”158 resulting in confusion among commanders. This fluidity and disorder 
are reduced through the use of a visual interface that can be used by commanders to 
categorize and sort information into useful groupings.159 Driesslein agrees and suggests 
the solution lies in a networked information system deployed across the battlespace, 
which reduces confusion and improves resource utilization and effectiveness.160 
Homeland security responders face the same fluidity as events unfold and evolve in the 
homeland, often confronting the same disorder described by Major Guron during the July 
2016 shootings of his officers. Homeland security responders would benefit equally from 
Driesslein’s system of networked relevant information during times of fluidity and 
disorder. 
Complexity and human factors are elements of the modern warfighting 
battlespace.161 The two are closely interrelated and presented frequently on the battlefield 
as war is a human endeavor. All the complexities of human morality can be found in the 
theater of war, as well as the effects of human exhaustion, willpower, courage, and 
fear.162 No amount of technical application can eliminate the complex presence of human 
factors on the battlefield, but Hudson and Rzasa contend that supported human decision 
making is the only effective response to this complexity. Support is best offered by an 
information system that delivers appropriate data within a useful timeframe.163 This same 
logic can be applied to homeland security incidents, as responders face the human factors 
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created by criminals, terrorists, and everyday citizens. The layers of human complexity 
within the homeland include willful plotting of violence to shoddy construction 
techniques contributing to fire loss. Management of this complexity within the homeland 
is best addressed by human decision making supported by an information system that 
organizes and filters relevant information in a timely manner. 
Violence and danger are ever-present on the battlefield.164 Warfare is the practical 
application of force to cause the submission of an enemy and is inherently dangerous.165 
Violence and danger are also ever-present in the homeland, with perhaps the principle 
difference between the purposes of the DOD and the DHS being the intentional use of 
force prevalent in warfare being absent in homeland security. That aside, danger is ever-
present in both arenas. The Marine Corps suggests the study of human fear as part of the 
doctrine for Marine officers.166 Through the study of fear, they can discover the means to 
manage and reduce it, thereby improving their performance and effectiveness. In the 
homeland, live fire training exercises and developing strong leadership skills among 
officers are applied in the name of fear reduction to improve homeland security response. 
While the missions are starkly different, the management of fear and the unknown 
through preparation and training are essential similarities between the DOD and the DHS. 
It stands to reason that those tools effectively applied in one arena can and should be 
considered for application in the other. A symbiotic relationship exists, with the DOD 
having an advantage in the breadth of experience and funding, thus making it a valuable 
proving ground for methods in matters of homeland security. 
B. NETWORKING THE BATTLESPACE FOR SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS 
American warfighters are finding their foes equipped with mobile information 
networks in the form of commercial cellular towers and handheld smartphones. This 
seemingly innocuous reality is providing enemies with better real-time situational 
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awareness, allowing exploitation of American information exchange weaknesses.167 
American armed forces deploy with arguably the best training and equipment in the 
history of man, yet in Afghanistan, the Taliban was able to outmaneuver U.S. forces 
effectively via the instant deployment of information from their leadership sequestered in 
Pakistan to their field commanders via smartphones.168 American fighting forces were 
faced with an enemy that rarely gathered in great strength, yet was able to share 
situational awareness information and manage their command and control using 
networked wireless communications.169 It became clear to America’s commander in 
theater, General Stanley McChrystal, that despite America’s superior fighting forces, they 
were facing information superiority, and developing a military information network was 
the only solution that would deliver the “knowledge, speed, precision, and unity of effort” 
necessary to defeat a networked enemy.170  
It was on the battlefields of Afghanistan that the U.S. military first attempted to 
connect every warfighting element. Regardless of role or geographic distribution, an 
attempt was made to form a comprehensive, wireless information network capable of 
managing not just the volume of wartime data, but also the effective dissemination of the 
right data to the right people at the right time.171 This military effort to network 
information effectively is still ongoing, but lessons about the value of network-centric 
warfare have emerged: Networks decentralize decision making, allowing speedier 
reactions to evolving conditions and eliminating information overload from a central 
commander. Networks also remove institutional boundaries, allowing cooperative but 
varying cultures to mesh, allowing more effective selection and utilization of resources. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a network was found to facilitate the emergence 
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of competence in decision making, regardless of rank.172 All these features are equally 
desirable during complex homeland security events involving multiple agencies that are 
geographically diverse and arrive with their own institutional context. The progression of 
network-centric response should be similarly developed using the same strategies as 
those of network-centric warfare. 
The traditional network model in use by the military, as well as most corporate 
and private networks, is the client/server network.173 A client/server relationship can be 
found within one computer between related software programs, but more importantly, the 
client/server relationship is best depicted by networked computers.174 In a client/server 
model, a central program runs on the more powerful server computer and its resources 
are accessed by an authorized client computer equipped with compatible client software. 
Data is exchanged in both directions between the client and the server, depending on the 
purpose of the software. Figure 9 depicts a traditional client/server network. 
 
Figure 9.  A Client/Server Network 
The most common application of networked client/server networks is the internet, 
which utilizes a defined communication protocol for communication between diverse 
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clients and servers known as transfer control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP).175 
According to the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Peter Chiarelli, developing a modern 
information network is the U.S. Army’s “highest modernization priority.”176 To that end, 
several field deployable systems have been developed utilizing commercial and 
proprietary technology whose purpose is to create a wireless client/server network within 
a theater of conflict.177 
C. THE WARFIGHTER INFORMATION NETWORK—TACTICAL 
The need for continuous networked communication of data during DOD 
operations has resulted in the development of the Warfighter Information Network – 
Tactical (WIN-T). WIN-T assets include all the features of a commercial client-server 
network but are built to military specification for ruggedness and portability. Their 
purpose is to extend an information network from fixed regional hubs to field units via 
typical network hardware like Ethernet modems and client computers using a defensible 
array of vehicle-borne network hubs, network nodes, and satellite terminals.178 WIN-T 
allows the interconnection of a variety of other information-sharing technologies on the 
battlefield and is interdependent on other systems including battle command servers, the 
enhanced position location and reporting system, and a range of vehicle-borne hardware 
for deployment.179 The development of the modern U.S. Army network referenced as a 
top priority by General Chiarelli is developing as the incremental steps of the WIN-T 
wireless communication system. The continuous availability of a wireless data 
information network is the backbone upon which situational awareness software solutions 
are developed. WIN-T is an over-land example of the hardened infrastructure required to 
create the pathways by which client/server applications communicate data and is 
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foundational to network-centric warfare. The military utilizes a range of other networks 
for communication at sea or in the air. To realize the known benefits of a network to 
homeland security response, this same communications backbone must exist at all times 
for the development of network-centric response capabilities. Efforts are underway but do 
not currently exist in the homeland. 
D. PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE NETWORK MODEL 
While network-centric warfare is currently built on client/server infrastructure, it 
is worthy to note other models are being studied by the DOD that may eliminate several 
of the known weaknesses of a client/server network. Weaknesses of client/server 
networks include overreliance on servers as hubs, which exposes the network to collapse 
if a hub is eliminated. As the client/server network becomes mobile, it is increasingly 
susceptible to the inherent difficulties of terrain, which interferes with wireless 
transmission via obstacles, distance, and unplanned concentration of nodes.180  
In a publish/subscribe network there is no central server; each mobile client is a 
publisher of and a subscriber to data relevant to the network.181 Each client “subscribes” 
to a particular topic that is stored in a series of tables on an overlaying network of 
information “brokers.” For all clients wishing to report on (publish) a topic, and all those 
interested in the updates of those topics (subscribers), each client remains up-to-date with 
the other, with no central oversight from a server.182 The simplest description of the 
benefit of such architecture is the network’s resilience in the mobile environment; with 
no dependence on servers, nodes may disappear and/or reappear and with no net effect on 
the information available at any given time. In layman’s terms, the network can lose 
clients with no functional loss of information. Driesslein describes the military 
application of a publish/subscribe network in his research on man-portable clients to 
allow networking of individual soldiers. His research focuses on the benefits of 
eliminating the addressing of routed network data, which is lost when the destination 
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address has been removed from the network. Publish/subscribe allows for the loss of 
individual soldiers while retaining the entire information knowledge base of the 
network.183  
Homeland security responders may not always face armed enemies intent on 
destroying their information network, but currently, the United States is not covered by a 
unifying wireless network infrastructure. The need for situational awareness information 
to reside within a resilient network is similar to the needs of the DOD. Homeland security 
networked clients will pass through terrain that interferes with reception, or travel 
distances that take them out of range of the network or concentrate in narrow areas 
resulting in poor network performance. All these parallel issues are improved in a 
publish/subscribe network that allows for intermittent connection of mobile client nodes 
with no overall loss of network information. 
E. LINK 16 
Link 16 is a tool in use by the United States Navy and Air Forces. Described as a 
“highly structured network” whose purpose is to share mission-related data in real time 
among air and sea assets.184 This proprietary system utilizes line of sight wireless 
communication between encoded Link 16 consoles to share live information across the 
network.185 Link 16 might be better described as a network of networks, as it allows 
administrators to divide client consoles into up to 127 separate networks.186 This ability 
allows smaller workgroups, for example, a flight of fighter aircraft, to utilize a theater-
wide Link 16 network but to maintain their flight-specific situational awareness as their 
data is separated from other users of the same network. This improves situational 
awareness by reducing information overload and delivering mission-specific data within 
a network managing much more information. Link 16 can sort information into layers 
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based on the assigned attributes of the users, which provides much needed informational 
context for situational awareness. Since Link 16 hardware is extremely proprietary, 
limited to line-of-sight, and has a physical limit to the number of users, it is a poor fit for 
domestic homeland security applications, but elements of its capabilities will be shown as 
critical to the success of network-centric response. 
F. RESOURCE MOVEMENT TRACKING SYSTEMS 
1. Blue Force Tracking  
In the 1990s, the digitization of the U.S. Army included moving the time and 
battle tested methods of analog resource tracking from the command post map table to 
the computer. The need for information superiority on the three most important 
battlefield questions has determined the fates of entire armies and nations: “Where am I?” 
“Where are my forces and other friendly forces?” “Where is the enemy and what is the 
best route to attack him?”187 Blue Force tracking is the first term ascribed to that digital 
effort, a software system run on military networks that reported the locations of friendly 
forces and known enemy forces. The arrival of the global positioning system (GPS) made 
the instant digitization of location data possible and opened an array of new capabilities 
for tracking resources.  
Early GPS answered the “Where am I?” but additional technology was needed to 
answer the remaining two questions. Understanding your location in relation to other 
resources and various objectives is essential information for warfighters and responders. 
Location is valuable to situational awareness as an individual but provides no awareness 
beyond self. The location of friendly and foe forces, directions of travel, and progress 
toward common objectives modifies individual knowledge by creating situational 
context. Contextual data is subtly different from single situational data points in that it 
colors the situational data by identifying relationships. The depiction of the relationships 
between the features, movements, and attributes of various resources is absolutely 
essential to creating battlefield situational awareness. Blue Force tracking was a first 
                                                 
187 Dunn, Blue Force Tracking—The Afghanistan and Iraq Experience and Its Implications for the 
U.S. Army. 
 60 
attempt not only to relay single unit data but to depict the contextual relationships 
between them and transmit them via networked clients.  
Interestingly, the name of the software system itself unintentionally identifies a 
semiotic principle important to relaying situational awareness. “Blue Force” is a semiotic 
contextual concept in use to help differentiate friend from foe in a digital environment. 
The use of colors to differentiate between forces predates academic writing on the 
subject. Soldiers in the Napoleonic era wore red (French) or blue (British) uniforms to 
help distinguish between them during the fog of war. The application of color to a 
resource takes advantage of the human ability to communicate with a visual language. On 
a Napoleonic battlefield, an officer could observe a cannon emplacement and use the 
color of the uniforms to identify its allegiance. The same principle has been digitized by 
Blue Force tracking: A quick glance at the various forces depicted digitally uses color 
variation to differentiate between friendly, allied, unknown, and aggressor forces. Figure 
10 depicts friendly military assets tracked as a “Blue Force.” 
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Figure 10.  Blue Force Tracker188 
The digitization of the war room map in conjunction with global positioning 
allows for the display of traditional battlefield formations but also an entire array of 
support forces. Troop maneuvering, directing fields of fire, and avoiding friendly-fire 
casualties requires the software system to identify friendly forces effectively, quickly, 
and consistently on the battlefield.189 Coloring all friendly forces blue is at once an 
incredibly simple concept, but is also an example of the power of semiotics in situational 
awareness. Tracking resources of all types during homeland security incidents will 
require the same elegant simplicity. 
2. Force XXI Battle Command—Brigade and Below 
The evolution of blue force tracking in the Army has arrived at a situational 
awareness system known as Force XXI Battle Command—Brigade and Below (FBCB2). 
                                                 




FBCB2 is the current digital command and control system in use by the U.S. Army.190 
FBCB2 terminals have been added to all mounted units of several Army brigades to 
provide situational awareness on the battlefield. FBCB2 reports on all friendly force 
locations as well as all known enemy force locations via graphics overlaid on a digital 
map.191 Figure 11 depicts a FBCB2 depiction of blue and red forces. 
 
Figure 11.  Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below192 
FBCB2 operates on the tactical internet created by the WIN-T network and 
depicts situational awareness data, as well as contextual relationships between resources. 
FBCB2 is similar in structure to Blue Force Tracker and due to the size of technology 
requirements, it does not deploy on anything smaller than a motorized vehicle.193 This 
limitation makes tracking resources smaller than vehicles (like infantry units or single 
soldiers) impossible with FBCB2.194 Driesslein suggests the possibility of integration 
                                                 
190 United States Army, Weapon Systems 2012 America’s Army: The Strength of the Nation, 108. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Source: “File:FBCB2 CreateDevice OperationsScreen.jpg,” last modified June 17, 2014, https:// 
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:FBCB2_CreateDevice_OperationsScreen.jpg.  
193 Driesslein, “Scalable Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) to Enhance Situational Awareness in 
Distributed Small Unit Operations,” 19. 
194 Ibid. 
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between FBCB2 systems and Link 16 systems, dramatically expanding the scope of 
battlespace situational awareness and command and control functions to land, sea, and air 
in theater. However, neither of these systems tracks the resources below the resolution of 
vehicles, leaving the unmounted soldier still unaccounted for in any expanded 
FBCB2/Link 16 network.195 Homeland security responders do not yet enjoy the benefit 
of tracking all resources at the vehicle level.  
G. MAPPING AT THE HEART OF MILITARY SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS 
Whether it be ground asset tracking with FBCB2 or sea and air assets with Link 
16, at the heart of each system lies a mapping tool. The data collected in each of these 
systems first and fore mostly attempts to answer that basic situational awareness 
question: where am I? A map is the best tool to answer that question.196 Maps have 
served that purpose in military operations long before the development of digital 
information exchange. Mapping dates to at least 5,000 B.C. with early examples found 
carved in stone.197 Mapping has long been a military function, including mapping of the 
world and oceans as civilizations spread across the globe. The modern American DOD 
relies heavily on the mapping of land, sea, air, and even space for the movement of 
resources and to provide continuously updated situational awareness data to users of the 
various systems previously described.  
The U.S. Army wants its maps to provide extensive information for its users. To 
that end, it has developed publication ADRP 1-02, which is a 350-page guide to common 
mapping terms and military symbols. The document incorporates and accompanies six 
different allied international reference documents on the same subject in an effort to 
establish a common contextual mapping language among all allied warfighters.198 ADRP 
                                                 
195 Driesslein, “Scalable Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) to Enhance Situational Awareness in 
Distributed Small Unit Operations,” 19. 
196 Meehan, “Access, Awareness, and Analysis—All in One Location Platform.” 
197 “Fundamentals of Mapping,” accessed August 17, 2016, http://www.icsm.gov.au/mapping/ 
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198 United States Army, ADRP 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols (Arlington, VA: United States 
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1-02 provides guidance on the creation of basic Army symbols, separated by resource 
type as depicted in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  ADRP 1-02 Military Symbols Schema199 
It is not necessary to be a trained military intelligence officer to recognize some of 
the important concepts of symbols in use by the Army. Army symbols, in this case, are 
separated into layers: units, equipment, installations, and activities depicted by unique 
shapes. They are further subdivided into groups: friendly, hostile, neutral, and unknowns. 
With minimal training, a layperson could learn to make these distinctions at a glance. 
When coupled with the power of a map, these symbols answer the critical questions 
about unit location, relationships, activities, and intentions. Figure 13 is an example of 
using semiotic principles to plot current and anticipated future tenses of circumstances to 
military symbols. 
                                                 
199 Source: United States Army, ADRP 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols, 3–2. 
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Figure 13.  Additional Context within ADRP 1-02200 
With a simple semiotic variation of these black and white line symbols, the Army 
is able to create situational awareness about current and anticipated resource locations 
and activities. It is also able to modify its basic symbols with “amplifiers” to add 
additional contextual information to each symbol. Figure 14 is a reference chart for the 
standard placement of amplifiers on U.S. Army symbols. 
 
Figure 14.  ADRP 1-02 Symbol Amplifier Schema201 
                                                 
200 Source: United States Army, ADRP 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols, 3–3. 
201 Source: Ibid., 3–4. 
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The various numbered locations represent standardized locations for the placement of 
amplifiers that add additional context to each symbol. These amplifiers include items like 
the country of origin, task force assignments, current activity, and other items drawn from 
the attributes of the unit itself.202  
This is a critical point and warrants repeating. Army symbols draw data from the 
attributes of the resource and are used to amplify (improve) the symbol’s ability to 
provide situational awareness by adding context to the symbol itself. Marking and 
mapping locations of resources and easily interpreting the context of those resources are 
highly desirable capabilities for homeland security operations. While the missions are 
different, the challenges faced by warfighters and homeland security responders are 
interrelated. The DOD has found the mobile data network to be its top development 
priority for communicating situational awareness between allied resources. Its networked 
situational awareness tools are built on map-based mediums, using color and shape to 
communicate visually, with symbols that can be modified (or amplified) with contextual 
data to improve warfighters’ understanding of not only their location and actions, but the 
location and actions of friendly and aggressor assets within their chosen field of view. A 
common visual language for communicating this awareness must be defined for 
homeland security responders. 
                                                 
202 United States Army, ADRP 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols, 3–6. 
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V. SEMIOTIC PRINCIPLES FOR COMMUNICATING 
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN THE HOMELAND 
A. THE SCIENCE OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION 
Semiotics has been described as the intersection of the “world of thought and the 
world of physical objects.”203 Deely suggests the “whole of human experience, without 
exception, is an interpretive structure mediated and sustained by signs.”204 Visual 
communication combines the utility of verbal language with the multi-dimensionality of 
graphic representation.205 This compounding of communication, known as 
metalanguage, allows the transfer of cognitive information more effectively and at greater 
speed.206 Long before the science of semiotics was studied or understood, man has been 
using graphic representations to define and communicate the reality around him. The 
metalanguage afforded by visual communication allows more effective communication 
of situational awareness, whether it is on the battlefield or in the homeland. 
A map lies at the heart of a successful response.207 By definition, a map is a 
graphic representation of the real world, which can be rendered to relay many layers of 
information about the same physical space.208 Semiotic principles can be used to 
differentiate and convey geographic information better than verbal exchange. Verbally 
exchanged information is fraught with ambiguity and semantic interpretation that causes 
confusion during homeland security incidents.209 Visual communication can be pre-
planned and a homeland security language can be built around the concept of objectivity. 
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Visual conventions can be designed to be transparent and factual, reducing the confusing 
nuance of verbal communication.210  
B. PERTINENT PRINCIPLES OF SEMIOLOGY 
Communicating via a visual language is more effective than verbal language, 
allowing for compounded layers of information to be conveyed simultaneously as a 
metalanguage.211 Human perception of colors, shapes, and textures combined with 
points, lines, and planes can produce an “endless variety” of communicable units that far 
outstrips the possibilities of the spoken word both in terms of variety and data exchange 
rate.212 The colorme has been described as the most fundamental visual object; several 
properties unique to the colorme are relevant to visual communication in homeland 
security. 
(1) Color 
Chemists have identified over 60,000 varieties and shades of discernably different 
colors, and in general, humans are adept at distinguishing approximately 10,000 of them 
visually.213 At first glance, this suggests an almost endless palette for symbolizing 
information, but man is only able verbally to convey approximately 12 basic color 
groups, making many of the various shades impractical to oral description.214 As verbal 
communication will always play a role in homeland security incidents, the ability to 
verbally differentiate between elements of a visual language is desirable. Whysel 
suggests that the contrast between two colors may have more value than varying shades 
when communicating symbolized mapped information.215 Contrasting colors improves 
their visibility when overlaid on a variety of backgrounds, making high contrast a 
desirable quality for the visual language of homeland security. Interestingly, no literature 
                                                 
210 Kennedy et al., “The Work That Visualization Conventions Do,” 715–35. 
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suggests the use of high contrast colors in motion for display in digital media. An 
opportunity exists to define homeland security communication further through the use of 
high contrast colors in motion by using features of digital systems like fading, alternating, 
or blinking. 
(2) Shape 
Altering the basic shape of a colorme contributes to the visual language by 
creating differentiation. Simple geometric shapes are often used to convey visual 
information.216 The utilization of varying shapes is essential to communicating homeland 
security data, and is described by Kennedy et al. as a critical component of conveying 
objectivity.217 
(3) Size 
Dimension is another visual variable that helps define a colorme.218 Varying the 
dimensions of colormes creates context within the visual plane, by allowing comparisons 
between the dimensions of adjacent colormes.219 Size can be used to convey physical 
size, as well as contextual information like counts, volumes, and relative importance. 
(4) Texture 
Texture implies the sense of touch, but can also be conveyed visually. 
Conveyance of visual texture involves modulating color into regular and irregular 
patterns and is a powerful tool in conveying additional depth to a colorme.220 While most 
closely associated with art and painted media, texture in homeland security visual 
communications involves varying patterns and modulations of colors within the colorme 
to convey critical information. This convention is best practiced on information that 
occupies area, as texture is difficult to convey by point. Examples of potential uses for 
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texture in homeland security situational awareness could include varying the texture on 
mapped flood areas to depict the known depth of flood waters, a capability that was 
notably missing from ANSI INCITS 415-2006 point symbols. 
(5) Vector 
Vector conveys motion within the colorme, and adds additional contextual 
information.221 When a colorme is placed on a GIS, and directional vector information is 
included, the observer can determine both current location and direction. For homeland 
security visual communication, we might consider two vectors contextually relevant, 
actual direction and intended (anticipated) direction. Rapid visual identification of 
colormes with discrepancies in these two vectors would add important context for 
homeland security responders. 
(6) Compounding 
All these potential properties of a colorme can be combined in various ways to 
create an elegant but simple visual language that can be overlaid on maps to convey 
identity, location, direction, composition, and intention. Compounding colors with shape 
and size are useful for the creation of point symbols. Compounding contrast with texture, 
color, and size is useful for differentiating polygonal shapes with volume. Compounding 
these properties creates the metalanguage of cartographers and is ideal for network-
centric homeland security response. 
C. CONVEYING CONTEXT IN HOMELAND SECURITY SYMBOLOGY 
Visual communication requires the addresser and addressee to convey meaning 
successfully through signs and symbols. While the literal interpretation of “what” can be 
conveyed in a symbol, true understanding comes from the conveyance of “what” in 
context.222 Without context, the true meaning of a sign is much more likely to be lost in 
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the conveyance. Vickers, Faith, and Rossiter state “no sign can properly be interpreted 
without first contextualizing it.”223 
Simply identifying what something is, and where it is located, has some inherent 
value to homeland security responders. As Figure 2 depicted, these are the most basic 
requirements of mapped situational awareness data, but if this was the extent of the 
information needed to create situational awareness, then ANSI INCITS 415-2006 would 
not have experienced adoption issues. Responders need to know more than what and 
where to develop comprehensive situational awareness that leads to better decision 
making. When communicating visually, responders need contextual information that 
allows them to develop situational awareness. 
Kennedy et al. listed four conventions required for the conveyance of trustworthy 
contextual information including two-dimensional viewpoints, clean symbol design, 
simple geometric shapes and lines, and the inclusion of data sources224 [Emphasis 
added]. While not specifically expressed in their work, the inclusion of data sources 
should be expanded to mean the inclusion of contextual data within the symbols 
themselves. This contextual data should be drawn from the attributes of the feature being 
represented, creating situational context beyond the “what and where” of a simple point 
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Theory and Semiotics,” 1049. 
224 Kennedy et al., “The Work That Visualization Conventions Do.” Emphasis added. 
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Table 1.   Hypothetical Resource Attribute Table 
1 FEMA Resource Type Class 1 Fire Engine 
2 Unit Identifier Engine #6 
3 Status Assigned 
4 Federal/State/Local Local 
5 Owner City of Everett 
6 Souls 3 
7 Current Status Enroute 
8 Incident Assigned To #12345 
9 Incident Location Address or coordinates 
10 Radio Talkgroup Local Channel 5 
11 Operational Cycle Start 08/01/2016 08:00:00 
12 Operational Cycle End 08/01/2016 17:00:00 
13 Fuel Type Diesel 
 Fuel Capacity 45 Gallons 
 Current Fuel Level 22 Gallons 
14 Current Speed 25 
 
While a very simplistic attribute table, a great deal of contextual information 
exists within it, or can be easily calculated from its data. In this example, the identity of 
the unit, the number of souls assigned to that unit, its current status and incident 
assignment and remaining fuel can be derived from the values. When combined with 
GPS and a GIS, this attribute table could be used to provide contextual data in 
conjunction with relative location of other resources within a given map extent. Certainly, 
an attribute table like this one could underlie the simple GIS depiction of Figure 2, and 
with a little user or remote sensor input that attribute table might contribute the needed 
context for situational awareness. However, this thesis proposes that process be 
automated, with elements drawn from the attribute table for rapid sharing of situational 
awareness. Figure 15 is a magnification of Figure 2. 
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Figure 15.  Magnification of Figure 2 
First, consider the possible cartographic pragmatics of Figure 15. Assuming that 
north is conventionally agreed to be the top of the display and the lines are part of an 
unnamed street network, a user can deduce some information about the two overlaid 
units. “E6” is north and west of “3133.” With some training in the system, an 
understanding of the labeling of units reveals “E6” to be a local fire engine and “3133” to 
be a local city police car. These two point symbols draw only one piece of data from a 
hypothetical attribute table: unit identifier. 
Assuming the system depicted allows users to query for a feature attribute table 
similar to that in Table 1, additional contextual information could be drawn from the 
attribute data to answer situational awareness questions like: are these two units assigned 
to the same incident? What is the count of responder souls represented by these two 
units? Are they federal, state, or local assets? When compared to the time of day, how far 
into their operational cycles are they? What time will they require replacements? 
Assuming the feature attribute table is accessible and kept up-to-date, simple math will 
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allow for all these calculations. However, creating symbols that compound semiotic 
principles would allow the computer to do the simple computations and display the 
situational awareness data in a much more comprehensible manner. Figure 16 is a 
hypothetical symbol framework utilizing contextual elements drawn from an attribute 
table. 
 
Figure 16.  Proposed Hypothetical Point Symbol with Added Context 
Figure 16 is a hypothetical design for conceptualizing a homeland security point 
symbol basic framework that incorporates data from the feature attribute table to create 







1 Outer frame shape 
2 Feature Unit Identifier 
3 Directional vectors (Actual and assigned) 
4 Work cycle countdown timer 
5 Frame fill area 
6 Sensor bank 
7 Inner frame shape  
8 Unit status (available, assigned, unavailable) 
Figure 17.  Elements of a Proposed Hypothetical Point Symbol 
Figures 16 and 17 depict a hypothetical framework for designing homeland 
security symbols that incorporate information from the feature’s attribute table, which 
when added to a GIS, will provide answers not only to “where am I, and my forces” 
questions, but also critical contextual information about the features themselves. Semiotic 
principles can be further applied to this symbol to take full advantage of human 
perception of color, shape, size, texture, and vector. As depicted, these elements also take 
advantage of the principle of compounding. Figure 18 applies a few more visual elements 
to the hypothetical framework like color, and shape, to illustrate further the use of 
semiotic principles to improve the delivery of contextual data. 
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Figure 18.  Point Symbols with Compounded Semiotic Principles 
With these compoundable features available, the symbol can then be altered as the 
attribute data changes over time, allowing for real-time situational awareness. Figure 19 
depicts a hypothetical symbol displaying current attributes. 
 
Figure 19.  Point Symbol Depicting Evolving Attributes 
Interpretation of this symbol requires very little training or reference to a 
cataloged legend. The outer frame identifies a law enforcement asset, while the inner 
frame further defines it as a patrol unit. The unit identifier names it patrol car “3133.” 
The work cycle timer draws data from the attribute table to calculate the work time 
remaining. Cartographic pragmatics require a standard scale to be assigned to the full 
value of such a timer. The sensor bank could be assigned to the vehicle fuel level, in this 
case, showing one-half tank remaining. The unit status bar identifies this unit as being 
assigned to an incident, and the directional vectors depict approximate ground speed via 
arrow color and a discrepancy between the actual direction of travel and the assigned 
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objective. Figure 20 is a comparison of these contextually relevant hypothetical symbols 
to symbols that provide no little contextual information. 
Original 
Context Added 
Figure 20.  Comparison of Point Symbols with and without Context 
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Applying basic principles of semiology to mapped homeland security symbols allows for 
the creation of a metalanguage for situational awareness. Both Figure 20 images answer 
the basic situational awareness questions about relative resource locations described by 
Dunn.225 The hypothetical symbols, with information derived from their attribute tables, 
go further and provide desired information found to be lacking by responders using ANSI 
INCITS 415 symbols sets.226 When combined with the power of a wireless network, a 
situational awareness metalanguage is shared across an entire user group without the 
restrictions of simplex or duplex voice communications. 
Robinson, McEachren, and Roth found responders desire full-color symbols able 
to display the hierarchical nature of homeland security response, which was a described 
weakness of ANSI INCITS 415.227 In the example, the outer frame of the hypothetical 
model can be used to differentiate between the various response disciplines while the 
inner frame can be used to depict the placement of that resource within its disciplinary 
hierarchy. Another barrier mentioned by Robinson was the inability to adapt symbols to 
specific responder missions and physical infrastructure. The hypothetical model can be 
adapted with ease to represent various asset types, as well as building elements. Figure 21 
symbolizes a stairwell and provides contextually relevant information found in the 
attribute table of the feature. 
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Figure 21.  Stairwell Symbol, Everett Fire Department, Everett WA228 
Figure 21 compounds semiotic principles and is one of several “building features” 
depicted in the Everett Fire Department GIS Symbols Key and Users Guide. Without 
national guidance, the Everett Fire Department distinguished all building features as 
being yellow on a black background, in a square or rectangular shape.229 Figure 21 
graphically identifies stairwell #5 using a high-contrast symbol and is labeled with the 
floors the stairwell services, in this case, floors 1 through 2. Additional modifiers for 
stairwells at the Everett Fire Department include denoting the presence of fire 
suppression standpipes and roof access.230 Providing firefighters with these critical 
contextual data points allows them to make better decisions than would be possible with a 
simple point symbol depicting the location of a stairwell. 
D. HOMELAND SECURITY CARTOGRAPHIC CONVENTIONS 
Visual communication between parties and across networks requires a common 
understanding of the language fundamentals and a medium upon which to converse. The 
U.S. Army defines the elements of its visual language in a reference guide to their 
symbology. ADRP 1-02, the legend of the U.S. Army Terms and Military Symbols 
clearly defines each possible language item and its possible semiotic variations.231 While 
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ANSI INCITS 415-2006 attempts to create a similarly constructed legend for homeland 
security visual communications, it has been found to be lacking.232 No national standard 
defines the environment in which these symbols might be used, resulting in a wide range 
of unique communication tools that are not necessarily interoperable. 
Basic mapping conventions are referred to as “cartographic pragmatics.”233 
Cartographic pragmatics define the map that becomes the canvas for visual 
communication of situational awareness data; without a common set of mapping 
pragmatics, visual communication of data will be inconsistent, varying from one map tool 
to another. Cartographic conventions for items like north orientation, visual decay rate, 
and scales for changes in levels of detail are essential to creating a common visual 
language for symbolized situational awareness data.234  
An important cartographic pragmatic that must be applied to homeland security is 
known as “scale dependent rendering.”235 In short, the scale of a GIS map area being 
viewed, when compared to the size of the screen viewing it, will help determine the 
features to be displayed. As users draw in closer to mapped information, their ability to 
view increasing resource resolution allows for more and more contextual information. 
Currently, no national standard exists for symbolizing situational awareness information 
with varying degrees of resolution based on map scale. Figure 22 uses the elements of the 
hypothetical symbol framework to alter their appearance at different map scales, 
delivering increasing contextual information with decreasing map scales. 
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Figure 22.  Scale Dependent Rendering 
Full-color variations of the inner and outer frames allow for manipulation of map 
scope without creating an overload of indiscernible data when looking at wide areas. As 
the view of the homeland security map decreases past defined scale measures, the display 
of asset contextual information increases. In general, as the resolution (or scale) of a map 
view becomes more and more granular, additional semiotic elements should be 
compounded for improved communication. In Figure 22, the same feature is exhibited 
with progressively increasing semiotic features as resolution improves. Modifications to 
color, shape, size, texture, and vector allow for seamless transitions from one scale to 
another. This is an essential cartographic pragmatic that must be consistent across 
national map platforms to ensure communications interoperability and must be defined in 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The situational awareness needs of American homeland security responders are 
strikingly similar to the needs of American warfighters. Friction, as defined by the U.S. 
Marines, is also present in homeland security response and creates confusion among 
responders very similar to the “fog of war.”236 Warfighters and responders also face 
uncertainty, fluidity, and disorder in their respective endeavors. Similarities largely end 
there, as the armed forces are better organized and better funded than homeland security 
responders. When comparing only four branches of armed services funded exclusively 
from the federal budget, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines have an advantage over 
homeland security responders with separate budgets and operations from 18,000 police 
agencies, 27,000 fire agencies, and 9,500 emergency medical services agencies. 
American armed forces have developed doctrine and tools for managing these ever-
present battlefield issues with greater success than their homeland security counterparts 
and must be looked to for guidance by homeland security responders.  
Warfighters have identified the wireless digital information network as the key to 
managing that fog of war created by friction, uncertainty, fluidity, and disorder.237 
Successful warfighting is increasingly dependent on the presence of a network, leading 
military leaders to describe their work as network-centric, and identifying the 
development of network-centric warfare as their top modernization priority.238 The 
presence of a network in the battlespace provides four key advantages to the warfighter 
and is desirable for homeland security responders: 
• A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 
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• Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information 
and shared situational awareness. 
• Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization. 
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.239 
These tenets of network-centric warfare are desirable for homeland security response, 
which is driving the development of network-centric response infrastructure. 
Congress has recognized the value of these tenets in homeland security and 
authorized the creation of a national broadband network dedicated to achieving them in 
the homeland.240 FirstNet will provide the backbone for nationally networked homeland 
security communications and information exchange.241 With no national guidance, 
network-centric response tools are developing sporadically and incongruously among the 
myriad public and private enterprises servicing homeland security response, leaving the 
national interoperability issue unresolved. 
A map lies at the heart of situational awareness, and a geographic information 
system lies at the heart of tools developed for situational awareness among warfighters. 
Homeland security situational awareness tools in development mirror the efforts already 
well underway within the military. Network-centric communication via GIS allows for 
visual communication between networked responders. Symbolic visual communication is 
a metalanguage, able to convey situational awareness information more accurately and 
effectively than verbal communication.242 To overcome the interoperability issues that 
have plagued homeland security responders time and time again, a common national 
visual language for use in map-based network-centric response must be developed and 
effectively implemented. 
To be effective as a metalanguage, homeland security symbols must communicate 
more than the “what and where” of mapped resources; they must also supply contextual 
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information useful to responders. By compounding basic principles of semiotics and 
drawing data from the attributes of the mapped homeland security features, homeland 
security symbols sets can communicate contextual information critical to situational 
awareness. The following recommendations are intended to guide policymakers in their 
efforts to achieve that purpose. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The combination of these recommendations will result in the development of an 
interoperable visual language for communication of situational awareness among 
homeland security responders. 
1. Recommendation #1: Identify the Tenets of Network-centric Response 
as Essential to the Homeland Security Enterprise 
The four tenets of network-centric warfare reported to Congress by the DOD 
apply verbatim to homeland security response. Therefore, the DHS should recognize a 
network-centric response as doctrine, and direct the development of responder situational 
awareness tools for use in that environment. Critically, wireless networks allow for the 
use of visual communication, a metalanguage, which when combined with the 
multiplexing capabilities of computers, creates exponential growth in contextually rich 
situational awareness data exchange among responders. Network-centric response brings 
General McChrystals battlefield benefits to the homeland:243 
• Networks decentralize decision making, creating speedier reactions to 
changing conditions 
• Networks remove institutional boundaries, allowing cooperation 
• Networks allow more efficient utilization of resources 
• Networks facilitate competence in decision-making, at all levels of rank 
The presence of a network is essential to homeland security, but realizing these benefits 
will require the development of a common language for use in a networked environment. 
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2. Recommendation #2: The DHS Must Identify a GIS as the Medium 
within Which Networked Visual Communication of Situational 
Awareness Will Occur 
Human map making dates to earliest recorded history, and although ancient in 
concept, a map still lies at the heart of situational awareness for American warfighters 
and American homeland security responders.244 If a wireless network is a backbone for 
communicating situational awareness, a geographic information system should be 
recognized as the workspace in which that visual communication of situational awareness 
develops. The ability of a GIS to geolocate tabular data is unsurpassed in communicating 
the information needed to develop situational awareness. A GIS is a whiteboard upon 
which a visual metalanguage is shared across a networked force of responders. 
3. Recommendation #3: Define a Common Set of Cartographic 
Pragmatics and Cognitive Compromises Specific to Homeland 
Security 
Cartographic pragmatics and cognitive compromises are the conventions that 
define the rules of the mapping workspace.245 The DHS must define a basic set of each 
for use in a network-centric response environment. Defining a standard north orientation 
and minimum base layers for use in situational awareness mapping will allow diverse 
responders to access and understand the communication medium in a highly 
interoperable manner. 
Scale-dependent rendering and layering data within a GIS is critical to managing 
information overload among decision makers.246 By altering the volume of contextual 
information displayed based on the scope and scale of a displayed GIS, decision makers 
are able to continue making informed decisions relative to the scope and scale of their 
responsibilities. Varying magnifications allows the decision makers to drill into local data 
or view global data, depending on their need. The DHS must define conventions for 
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scale-dependent rendering so it is consistent nationally. This thesis suggests four separate 
point symbols for depicting the same resource at different scales. National policy should 
define the scopes and scales at which these symbols vary. 
4. Recommendation #4: Symbolize the FEMA’s Resource Guidebook to 
Create an Initial National Homeland Security Point Symbols Set 
A GIS has the inherent ability to sort and display features based on tabular data 
contained in a feature attribute table. This sorting is typically achieved visually by 
grouping features and displaying them in layers.247 An essential part of developing a 
visual communication language for homeland security will be to create groupings that 
will allow mapped features to be sorted into logical layers. While a myriad homeland 
security-related features can and should be included in a visual language for situational 
awareness, the FEMA resource definitions guide has already cataloged an essential 
feature set.248 Conveniently, FEMA has already subdivided the resources commonly used 
and exchanged during homeland security incidents into eight general categories:249 
• Animal health resources 
• Emergency management resources 
• Emergency medical services resources 
• Fire/HazMat resources 
• Health and medical resources 
• Law enforcement resources 
• Public works resources 
• Search and rescue resources 
These groupings represent the eight general layers into which homeland security 
resources should be divided for visual communication. The basic symbol framework 
depicted in Figure 16 suggests an outer frame, each of which should be designed to 
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differentiate between these eight groupings. The inner frame can then be used to identify 
the specific feature contained within each grouping and their relative position within each 
grouping’s hierarchy of resources. 
5. Recommendation #5: Design Attribute Tables for All Homeland 
Security Resources 
The visual language used to convey situational awareness among homeland 
security responders must convey more than “what and where.” The failure of the existing 
ANSI point symbols set for homeland security is a result of their inability to convey 
contextual information, and in a GIS, contextual information is stored in a feature 
attribute table. The FEMA Resource Guide does not define the critical attributes of the 
various typed resources. The DHS must organize an effort to develop attribute tables for 
each resource it types. A few attribute fields will be common to all typed resources but 
many are unique within each grouping and even more within each individual resource. 
SMEs from each of the eight fields must be consulted to identify the attributes of their 
various features to ensure a complete attribute table is designed for each and every 
cataloged FEMA resource.  
An identified, standardized attribute tables will allow software engineers to build 
the applications able to make use of each field, with emphasis on critical attributes. With 
a standardized attribute table, manufacturers can make use of increasingly affordable 
sensor arrays to begin automating the process of reporting some attribute fields like fuel 
level, temperature, speed, or geolocation. This table will underlie the point symbols used 
for visual communication and be the source of contextual data for the symbols 
themselves. Without an attribute table for each resource, it will be impossible to create a 
contextually rich visual language. 
6. Recommendation #6: Define Modifiers for the National Symbols Set 
Drawn from the Attribute Tables of Resources to Create Useful 
Context within Each Symbol 
The DHS should collaborate with the ANSI to redevelop the national point 
symbols set for homeland security mapping. The new symbols set should be designed to 
eliminate the shortcomings of ANSI INCITS 415-2006 by taking full advantage of basic 
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semiotic principles in their design and create context by incorporating feature attribute 
data within the symbol itself. Size, shape, and color of the symbol outer frame should be 
used to differentiate visually between the eight resource type layers. The inner frame 
should apply these same semiotic principles to visually differentiate further between the 
resource types within each layer.  
Additionally, each FEMA-typed feature should have four symbols developed for 
use in scale-dependent rendering, with the volume of contextual information increased 
with each symbol as the scope and scale of the map decreases. Each symbol must display 
some information from its attribute table to create much-needed context. Frame 
amplifiers similar to those in use by the U.S. Army (see Figure 14) should be defined for 
the display of contextually relevant attribute data within the symbols themselves. 
C. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
(1) Expand the National Symbols Set to Include Polygonal Shapes  
While it is outside the scope of this thesis, there is a need for national standards 
for symbolizing homeland security features that cannot be depicted by a single point. 
Polygonal areas of flooding, wildfires, crime scenes, or homeland security bounded areas 
of any kind deserve the same design consideration as point symbols. Texture is a semiotic 
principle not well addressed by this thesis, as it is difficult to convey via a single point 
symbol; however, in addition to the size, shape, and color variations found in point 
symbols, those features requiring polygonal volume should find great benefit from 
varying textures. 
(2) DARPA Squad X Implications 
As an open-source thesis written by a civilian, it is impossible to know the true 
state of the art of situational awareness technology within the armed forces. Driesslein 
offers a non-classified glimpse into the evolving landscape of networked awareness in the 
armed forces with his response to the DARPA Squad X competition.250 It is clear the 
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armed forces are well along in their research and development of low-cost, lightweight, 
man-portable hardware and sensor arrays that will carry network-centric warfare benefits 
out of mounted units to the individual soldiers.  
This thesis recommends a visual language for communication of situational 
awareness between mounted and fixed homeland security assets. The Squad X 
competition results demonstrate that networked information and decision making will 
eventually arrive at the single soldier resolution; thus, it can be inferred that while it may 
occur in the footsteps of the armed forces, it will also eventually arrive at the single 
responder resolution for homeland security. This suggests that any development of a 
national symbol set for homeland security situational awareness should leave an 
allowance for future increases in granularity. Every effort should be made to follow the 
example being set by the armed forces in this area. 
(3) Create a National Infrastructure Symbols Set Which Conveys Context 
Also outside the scope of this thesis, but relevant and necessary for responders, is 
the ability to map essential features of their community infrastructure. Features of 
building construction, known community hazards, drug houses, hazardous storage, and 
many others also need to be mapped and symbolized nationally. Figure 21 showed an 
example of adding contextual information to a building feature symbol. The principles of 
semiotics and context should be applied to the expansion of the homeland security 
symbols set to include these kinds of features to improve further response effectiveness 
and efficiency.  
(4) High-Resolution Z-Axis Geolocation and Augmented Reality 
Global positioning and GIS mapping have historically converted three-
dimensional data to two-dimensional data by rasterizing and layering it.251 Both these 
systems depend on accurate x and y-axis information to carry out the geolocation process, 
but even these systems are evolving rapidly to include a third dimension. Three-
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dimensional mapping is becoming increasingly common and research is being directed at 
methods to develop high-resolution z-axis data for mapped features.252 
Highly reliable z-axis geolocation will open a new era in mapped situational 
awareness by providing accurate indoor altitude data, creating a use for interior mapping 
of floorplans at all elevations. While this technology is not currently available, it lies at 
the top of the priority list for both military and civilian researchers.253 Accurate x, y, and 
z-axis location data, when combined with developing visual augmentation technology, 
may be combined with man-portable networked technology to provide an augmented 
reality view, even in low or no visibility environments. Thus, the trustworthy two-
dimensional symbols suggested in this thesis must eventually become three-dimensional 
symbols, adding another important semiotic element for compounding meaning. It is 
essential the DHS begin the national process of familiarizing responders with network-
centric response, visual communications, and mapped situational awareness as the 
technology continues to advance. 
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